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Public health policy operates in a democratic paradox. The police power exists 
to protect individuals from harms they cannot themselves fend off, but every 
restriction of individual freedom in the name of public health runs against 
constitutionally protected individual rights. Public health officials are damned if 
they do, damned if they don’t. 
But policymakers can take steps to avoid litigation by partnering with the public 
in contentious public health decisions. District 27 Community School Board v. 
Board of Education and events leading to the lawsuit exemplify the democratic 
paradox. A largely overlooked case, District 27 is one of the most important 
early AIDS cases. It was the first to consider the disease in depth. The case 
established the dearth of evidence that AIDS could be transmitted casually. And 
District 27 signaled that AIDS did not demand and law did not permit 
discrimination. This article dusts off District 27 and uses New York City’s
policy-making process as a case study for public health policymaking in an 
epidemic. It suggests ways lawyers and policymakers can balance secrecy and 
transparency against democratic ideals, as well as how valuing the public and 
allowing public input enhances policy decisions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On the first day of school in 1985, between 10 and 20 thousand pupils in the New York 
City borough of Queens played hooky with their parents’ permission.1 The students and their 
parents were protesting New York City’s decision to allow an unidentified elementary schoolchild 
with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) to attend public school. The two school 
districts in which most of the truants lived had already filed suit to bar any child with AIDS from 
any public school attended by children who did not have AIDS,2 but the public’s hysteric fear of 
the disease spilled into the streets. Angry parents and students marched, chanting, “We want good 
grades, not AIDS.”3 Children paraded with a coffin that asked, “Is This Next?”4  Outside Public 
School 60 in Woodhaven, Queens, parents posted a warning—”Enter at your own risk.”5 In his 
                                                                
1 Pupils Out in AIDS Protest, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 9, 1985, at A8 (estimating 10,000 students 
stayed home); AIDS Boycott at 63 N.Y. Schools, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 10, 1985, at 5 (estimating 18,000). 
2  Reported Opinion, Dist. 27 Cmty. Sch. Bd. v. Bd. of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 328-29 (Sup. Ct. Queens 
Cnty. 1986). A note on citations to the District 27 opinion: Under N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 7300.5 (2016), 
the State Reporter may approve a trial court opinion for publication with certain conditions. The “partial publication rule”
allows the State Reporter to impose length criteria for reported cases. When the State Reporter invokes the partial 
publication rule, the judge determines which portions of the opinion are truncated. Selection of Opinions, N.Y. OFFICIAL 
REP., https://web.archive.org/web/20140816081026/http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/Selection.htm (last visited May 
12, 2016).  Portions of opinions omitted from the printed reporter do not lose their legal effect in the way an unreported 
opinion might. The judge in District 27 wrote an eighty-two-page opinion but truncated it for publication. When 
information cited is contained therein, this article will refer to the reported opinion as it does above. It will refer to 
materials not in the reported opinion as follows: Opinion in Full, Dist. 27 Cmty. Sch. Bd. v. Bd. of Educ., No. 14940/85 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. Feb. 11, 1986). 
3  Joe Starita, Fear Divides Officials, Public as AIDS Alarm Grips N.Y., MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 12, 1985, at 
A18.
4  DAVID L. KIRP, LEARNING BY HEART: AIDS AND SCHOOLCHILDREN IN AMERICA’S COMMUNITIES 112 
(1989). 
5 AIDS Boycott at 63 N.Y. Schools, supra note 1. 
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characteristically unapologetic manner, New York City Mayor Edward I. Koch shamed parents: 
“What are you going to do, take a child that the doctors have said is no threat to any other 
children and just cast that child into the river?”6
A less hysteric but more historic drama was unfolding that day inside a Queens County 
courtroom. Supreme Court Justice Harold Hyman was considering whether to grant the school 
districts’ request for a temporary restraining order to bar the unnamed child from the undisclosed 
school he or she would attend.7 Hyman ultimately answered Koch’s question: At least for the time 
being, the judge would “not interfere with the child’s being in school[.]”8 Hyman set the case for 
trial to begin in three days. Over the course of the following five weeks, lawyers, doctors, 
scientists, and a judge who was just “trying to learn” about AIDS would turn the Queens County 
Supreme Court into a public classroom.9 The resultant product was an eighty-two page judicial 
opinion that would read like a textbook on AIDS, medical science, and policymaking. 
District 27 Community School Board v. Board of Education “addressed the broadest 
range of issues”10 of any case in the “brief firestorm of litigation over the rights of children with 
HIV infection to attend school with their peers.”11 It was “the bellwether case,”12 in large part 
because District 27 established “the paucity of evidence implicating casual contact as a means of 
viral transmission.”13 District 27 also helped “defin[e] AIDS as a disease that did not demand 
discrimination as part of its treatment by the body politic [and] domesticated the epidemic, 
making it fit for norms of law and common decency.”14
Despite being one of the most important early AIDS cases, District 27 largely has been 
forgotten. Justice Hyman’s eighty-two-page opinion is truncated in the official reports. Some of 
the most important aspects of the case are inaccessible outside archives. Among the portions of 
Justice Hyman’s opinion lost to the archival dustbins are the judge’s history of the AIDS 
epidemic, findings of fact detailing New York City’s response to pediatric AIDS, analysis of the 
city’s process for screening school children with AIDS before placing them in classrooms, and the 
judge’s scathing three-page commentary criticizing city officials for undemocratic, imperialist 
decision making. In retrospect, District 27’s omitted sections are among its most important.  They 
contextualize policymaking and the public dread of an epidemic spreading from society’s fringes 
during the early AIDS crisis. Three decades after New York City decided a seven-year-old girl 
who had been diagnosed with AIDS posed no threat to her classmates, the time is ripe to 
reexamine District 27 as a learning tool for understanding how public health and politics often 
collide—and how policymakers can soften the impact. 
What follows is a reflection on the District 27 drama. Part I provides the setting for 
                                                                
6 Id.
7 AIDS Case Spurs Protest in New York, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 10, 1985, at A1; See generally
Reported Opinion, Dist. 27 Cmty.Sch. Bd., 502 N.Y.S.2d at 328. 
8 Pupils Out in AIDS Protest, supra note 1. 
9  Joseph P. Fried, Judge ‘Trying to Learn’ in School AIDS Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1985, at B5. 
10  Frederic C. Kass, Schoolchildren with AIDS, in AIDS AND THE LAW 66, 72 (Dalton et al. eds. 1987). 
11  SCOTT SKINNER-THOMPSON, AIDS AND THE LAW 5-31-32 (5th ed. 2015). 
12 Id. at 5-32. 
13  Kass, supra note 10, at 75. 
14  KIRP, supra note 4, at 129. 
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District 27. It describes the immense fear flowing from the sudden emergence of an often fatal 
disease with no known cure, explores how medical science reacted, and touches on how AIDS 
transformed from the “gay plague” into a disease that knows no bounds. Part II takes readers into 
New York City government during the mid-1980s, examining how the city’s public health and 
school officials approached an inevitable question: What, if anything, should the city do about 
public school children diagnosed with AIDS? The city’s policy-making process was tainted by 
secrecy, but the policy itself struck an appropriate, medically sound balance between AIDS-
diagnosed children’s rights and other children’s safety. Part III explores the District 27 trial in 
great detail, revisiting the problems caused by secrecy in the policy-making process. The District 
27 trial illustrates differences in how the public, medical science, and policymakers conceptualize 
risk—particularly health risks to children. The trial vividly demonstrates secrecy and distrust can 
threaten even the best-intentioned health and safety policies. Part IV uses New York City’s
decision-making process leading to the District 27 trial as a case study for understanding how to 
use democratic persuasion to make better public policy, even during times of fear and hysteria. It 
suggests ways to balance secrecy and transparency against democratic ideals, as well as how 
policymakers can (and should) value the public and public input to enhance policy decisions. The 
Epilogue brings District 27 into the twenty-first century, with looks at people’s understanding of 
AIDS thirty years later and whether policymakers have truly learned from the early AIDS crisis. 
I. DISTRICT 27 IN CONTEXT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF AIDS 
In retrospect, District 27 Community School Board v. Board of Education was a 
Freytagian affair.15 The drama’s exposition had been ongoing for the preceding five years as 
AIDS slowly became national news.16 The first contemporaneously documented cases of what 
would become known as AIDS cropped up among homosexual men in 1981. Shortly after 
epidemiologists identified the syndrome as something new, they documented its occurrence 
beyond the homosexual male population, in intravenous drug abusers, hemophiliacs, newborns 
whose mothers were infected, and heterosexual partners of the other risk groups.17 By 1985, the 
AIDS crisis was in full swing, and New York City was its epicenter.18 But the public did not yet 
understand—or did not want to understand—the disease, how it could be spread, and how to 
prevent it. District 27 largely was a product of the knowledge gap between public health and the 
public at large, which dovetailed with people’s anxiety that the deadly disease would leach from 
                                                                
15 See George Hartley, Analyzing a Story’s Plot: Freytag’s Pyramid, ENGLISH 250 FICTION UNIT (OHIO ST.
UNIV.), https://web.archive.org/web/20141208170029/http://www.ohio.edu/people/hartleyg/ref/fiction/freytag.html (last 
visited May 12, 2016) (depicting Freytag’s Pyramid). Gustav Freytag was a German writer and critic, who created a 
widely taught visual pyramid for analyzing dramatic plots. An Online Resource Guide to Freytag’s Pyramid, INTUIT 
QUICKBASE, https://web.archive.org/web/20140814072430/http://quickbase.intuit.com/articles/an-online-resource-guide-
to-freytags-pyramid (last visited May 12, 2016). 
16 A History of AIDS Up To 1986, AVERT, https://web.archive.org/web/20140729184832 
/http://www.avert.org/history-aids-1986.htm (last visited May 12, 2016); See generally RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND 
PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (1987) (providing an early history of the AIDS crisis in 
chronology). 
17 See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. 
18 See Jesus Rangel, City Expanding Its Plan to Help Victims of AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1985, at A27 
(noting that 35 percent of AIDS victims were in N.Y.C., whereas only 12 percent were in S.F.). 
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high-risk groups to the general population. Widespread fear impacted public health policy 
throughout the country, and New York City’s decision whether to allow children diagnosed with 
AIDS to attend public school heightened the public alarm.19 Thus, to understand District 27, one 
must first understand the early history of the AIDS epidemic in the United States. 
A. An Era of Discovery: 1981 - 1984 
The scientific community generally understands HIV-1, the principal cause of the 
worldwide AIDS epidemic, “evolved from a virus that crossed the species barrier from 
chimpanzees to humans.”20 The evolutionary histories of HIV-1 and the closely related simian 
immunodeficiency virus, which affects chimpanzees, suggest the cross-species jump occurred in 
Central Africa in the early 1900s.21 The virus adapted to humans and began to spread. Because its 
victims succumbed to ordinary pathogens and disease, enabled and accelerated by the virus’s
decimation of the human immune system, HIV-1 spread unchecked around the world through the 
1960s and 70s—at some point entering the Western Hemisphere.22 AIDS was not recognized as a 
clinical entity, meaning it was not identified as a diagnosable medical disorder, until December 
1981;23 but tissue and serum samples taken in 1968 from a St. Louis teenager who later died from 
Kaposi’s sarcoma tested positive for HIV antibodies.24 The teenager apparently had never left the 
United States, leading researchers to conclude the virus that causes AIDS was already spreading 
in this country by the 1960s.25
By 1980, the “silent killer” had spread to at least five of the six inhabited continents (the 
virus’s timeline in Asia is unclear) and infected up to 300,000 people worldwide.26 Soon, a 
usually benign cancer would begin killing gay men in New York, and a rare strain of pneumonia 
would begin killing gay men in both New York and California. Silent no more, the killer would 
become known as America’s “gay plague.”27
                                                                
19 See James O. Mason, CDC’s 60th Anniversary: Director’s Perspective, 55 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 1354 (Dec. 22, 2006) [hereinafter MMWR]. 
20  Kevin M. De Cock, Harold W. Jaffe & James W. Curran, Reflections on 30 Years of AIDS, 17 
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1044, 1045 (2011). 
21 Id.
22  Jonathan M. Mann, AIDS: A Worldwide Pandemic, in 2 CURRENT TOPICS IN AIDS 1, 1 (Michael S. 
Gottlieb et al. eds., 1989); De Cock, Jaffe & Curran, supra note 20, at 1045. 
23  Myron Essex, The Etiology of AIDS: Introduction and Overview, in AIDS: PAPERS FROM SCIENCE, 1982-
1985, 3, 3 (Ruth Kulstad ed., 1986). 
24  Robert F. Garry et al., Documentation of an AIDS Virus Infection in the United States in 1968, 260 
JAMA 2085, 2085-87 (1988). 
25 See Dennis H. Osmond, Epidemiology of HIV/AIDS in the United States, U.C.S.F. HIV INSITE (Mar. 
2003), https://web.archive.org/web/20140708042432/http://hivinsite.ucsf.edu/InSite?page=kb-01-03. 
26  Mann, supra note 22, at 1. 
27 See Cristine Russell, Man Cures, But Diseases Adapt, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1983, at A1 (reporting that 
what became known as AIDS was “[f]irst called the gay plague”). 
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1. The “Gay Plague”
AIDS became a clinical entity when Michael S. Gottlieb, a Los Angeles immunology 
professor, and his colleagues recognized pneumocystis pneumonia (PCP), which until that time 
was documented in the United States almost exclusively among the severely immunosuppressed, 
was occurring at elevated rates among homosexual men.28 Gottlieb’s team submitted an article to 
the New England Journal of Medicine describing the PCP infections as occurring among 
“previously healthy, homosexual men” in the Los Angeles area, which the researchers ascribed to 
a “potentially transmissible immune deficiency.”29 While awaiting publication, Gottlieb reported 
his observations to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC), resulting in a then-overlooked 
note in Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report titled “Pneumocystis Pneumonia – Los Angeles,”
which is now recognized as the start of the AIDS crisis in the United States.30
Around the same time as Gottlieb and his team were observing strange PCP infections 
among homosexual men, the spring of 1981, a New York doctor was documenting an unusual 
outbreak of Kaposi’s sarcoma among gay men in New York City and San Francisco.31 The 
sudden outbreak of Kaposi’s sarcoma was alarming, not only because cases should be seen rarely, 
if ever, but also because it appeared to be targeting gay men.32 The usually benign cancer was also 
behaving abnormally: Its targets were decades younger than they should have been. The telltale 
lesions had appeared all over patients’ bodies, rather than on their legs. And the men were dying 
way too fast.33 A collection of doctors investigated the eight cases in which the Kaposi’s sarcoma 
patients had died and found all the men positive for hepatitis B and a slew of other sexually 
transmitted diseases. The researchers hypothesized the cancer’s “unusual occurrence” was related 
to the men’s “expos[ure] to sexually transmitted diseases.”34
The Kaposi’s sarcoma investigation was national news, but it was not yet front-page 
news.35 That changed in July when the CDC linked Gottlieb’s report from the June 5, 1981, issue 
of Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) with the Kaposi’s sarcoma occurrences. 
Because the first five PCP patients, whose cases comprised the June 5 report, were unrelated to 
one another and had no common contacts or sexual partners,36 the PCP outbreak first appeared to 
be a mere coincidence. Within a month, however, MMWR reported ten new cases of PCP among 
gay men in Los Angeles, “suggest[ing] the 5 previously reported cases were not an isolated 
                                                                
28 See Essex, supra note 23, at 3. 
29  Michael S. Gottlieb et al., Pneumocystis carinii Pneumonia and Mucosal Candidiasis in Previously 
Healthy Homosexual Men: Evidence of a New Acquired Cellular Immunodeficiency, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1425, 1425 
(1981). 
30 See generally CDC, Pneumocystis Pneumonia – Los Angeles, 30 MMWR 1 (June 5, 1981). 
31 See generally Alvin E. Friedman-Kien, Disseminated Kaposi’s Sarcoma Syndrome in Young 
Homosexual Men, 5 J. AM. ACAD. OF DERMATOLOGY 468 (Oct. 1981). 
32 See Lawrence K. Altman, Rare Cancer Seen in 41 Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1981, at A20. 
33 See generally Kenneth B. Hymes et al., Kaposi’s Sarcoma in Homosexual Men - A Report of Eight 
Cases, 318 LANCET 598 (1981). 
34 Id. at 598. 
35 See Altman, supra note 32. 
36  CDC, supra note 30, at 1-3. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol19/iss4/1
2016] OPENING THE SCHOOLHOUSE DOOR TO THE AIDS VIRUS 265 
phenomenon.”37 The breakouts of two opportunistic infections—PCP and Kaposi’s sarcoma—
among previously healthy homosexual men who did not fit the traditional profiles of those 
diseases raised eyebrows at the CDC. In its July 3, 1981, MMWR, the CDC linked the outbreaks 
and warned physicians to “be alert for Kaposi’s Sarcoma, PC pneumonia, and other opportunistic 
infections associated with immunosuppression in homosexual men.”38 But the spate of 
opportunistic infections did not appear to be a danger to anyone except gay men.39 By 1982, 
doctors and the public were aware of this nameless new disease—referred to by some as the “gay 
plague” and initially among researchers as Gay-Related Immune Deficiency—sweeping through 
the gay community, demolishing men’s immune systems, and enabling otherwise survivable 
pathogens to consume their victims.40
The disease’s etiology was widely hypothesized. Perhaps the syndrome was related to 
homosexuals’ use of the chemical inhalants amyl nitrate or isobutyl nitrate, commonly known as 
“poppers.” Both were widely used by gay men, including those diagnosed with PCP and Kaposi’s
sarcoma, to enhance sexual experiences; and the nitrates were known immunosuppressants.41 Or 
the disease could be due to the effects of repeated exposure to sperm, a theory later described as a 
“sophisticated theory” built upon the notion that “repeated exposure to another’s sperm could 
trigger an immune response, resulting in a condition resembling chronic graft-versus-host disease 
and, ultimately, opportunistic infections” like PCP and Kaposi’s sarcoma.42 Still others 
hypothesized AIDS was due to “a sort of physiological battle fatigue in which the immune system 
simply wore out.”43 Many of these theories retrospectively read much like the plainer public 
explanation: AIDS was simply punishment for homosexuals’ and intravenous drug users’ terrible 
lifestyles.44
                                                                
37  CDC, Kaposi’s Sarcoma and Pneumocystics Pneumonia Among Homosexual Men—New York City and 
California, 30 MMWR 305, 306 (July 3, 1981). 
38 Id. at 307.
39 See Altman, supra note 32. 
40 See generally SHILTS, supra note 16 (using the term GRID); Kent A. Sepkowitz, AIDS—The First 20 
Years, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1764, 1765 (2001) (replacement of GRID with AIDS); Geoffrey Cowley, The Day They 
Discovered the AIDS Virus, MSNBC (Apr. 23, 2014, 12:07 p.m.), https://web.archive.org/web/20140813100257/ 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/the-day-they-discovered-the-aids-virus (the public’s association of AIDS with homosexuals 
long after it was documented among other groups). 
41 See Sepkowitz, supra note 40, at 1764 (discussing early etiology theories); see, e.g., James J. Goedert, 
Amyl Nitrate May Alter T-Lymphocytes in Homosexual Men, 319 LANCET 412 (1982) (suggesting nitrates may be a causal 
factor for immunosuppression related to Kaposi’s Sarcoma in homosexual men). 
42  Sepkowitz, supra note 40, at 1764 (characterizing Giora M. Mavligit et al., Chronic Immune Stimulation 
by Sperm Alloantigens: Support for the Hypothesis that Spermatozoa Induce Immune Dysregulation in Homosexual 
Males, 251 JAMA 237 (1984)). See SHILTS, supra note 16, at 118-33 (discussing researchers’ initial focus on “poppers 
and the sperm theory”). 
43  Sepkowitz, supra note 40, at 1764 (characterizing Joseph Sonnabend, et al., Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome, Opportunistic Infections, and Malignancies in Male Homosexuals: A Hypothesis of Etiologic Factors in 
Pathogenesis, 249 JAMA 2370 (1983) and Jay A. Levy & John L. Ziegler, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome is an 
Opportunistic Infection and Kaposi’s Sarcoma Results from Secondary Immune Stimulation, 322 LANCET 78 (1983)). 
44 See, e.g., William F. Buckley, Jr., Op-Ed., Crucial Steps in Combating the AIDS Epidemic: Identify All 
the Carriers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1986, at A27 (suggesting homosexuals with AIDS be tattooed with a “scarlet letter” to 
protect others). See generally SHILTS, supra note 16 (exploring the public’s perception of the AIDS epidemic). 
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2. AIDS Becomes a Clinical Entity and Diagnoses Expand Beyond Homosexuals 
In popular thought the disease remained the “gay plague”, even after public health 
abandoned the “Gay-Related Immune Deficiency” terminology. Almost as soon as the disease 
became a clinical entity, AIDS was documented among intravenous drug users45 and 
hemophiliacs.46 AIDS was also reported in risk-group members’ sex partners and newborn 
children of infected mothers.47 The first cases of heterosexual AIDS transmission were reported 
from New York in the January 7, 1983, MMWR.48 And the disease was also cropping up 
worldwide. As Lawrence Altman wrote in The New York Times that year, “In many parts of the 
world there is anxiety, bafflement, a sense that something has to be done–although no one knows 
what–about this fatal disease.”49 No one knew what to do because no one knew what caused the 
disease in the first place.50 Then, in 1983 and 1984, a group of French scientists and a group of 
U.S. scientists each isolated a new retrovirus as the causal mechanism for AIDS.51 The U.S. 
scientists called the virus Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III (HTLV-III). The French called it 
Lymphadenopathy Associated Virus (LAV). In 1986, after political jockeying over whether to use 
the U.S. or French moniker, HTLV-III/LAV was renamed Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV).52
In the years preceding discovery of the virus that causes AIDS, the field of retrovirology 
had been developing rapidly and allowed scientists to quickly develop a test for HIV antibodies.53
The antibody test then led to three important discoveries: (1) the latency period from HIV 
infection to the AIDS stage is many years; (2) at the time the virus was discovered, the number of 
people infected with HIV was much greater than the number of people showing symptoms; and 
                                                                
45 See Henry Masur, et al., An Outbreak of Community-Acquired Pneumocystis carinii Pneumonia: Initial 
Manifestation of Cellular Immune Dysfunction, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1431 (1981) (finding PCP and immunosuppression 
among homosexuals and drug abusers). 
46  CDC, Pneumocystis carinii Pneumonia Among Persons with Hemophilia A, 31 MMWR 365-67 (July 16, 
1982). 
47 See Essex, supra note 23, at 3. 
48  CDC, Immunodeficiency Among Female Sexual Partners of Males with Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome (AIDS) – New York, 31 MMWR 697 (Jan. 7, 1983). 
49  Lawrence K. Altman, Concern Over AIDS Grows Internationally, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1983, at C1. 
50 Id.
51 See Françoise Barré-Sinoussi, et al., Isolation of a T-Lymphotropic Retrovirus from a Patient at Risk for 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 220 SCI. 868 (1983); Mikulas Popovic, et al., Detection, Isolation, and 
Continuous Production of Cytopathic Retroviruses (HTLV-III) from Patients with AIDS and Pre-AIDS, 224 SCI. 497 
(1984); Robert C. Gallo, et al., Frequent Detection and Isolation of Cytopathic Retroviruses (HTLV-III) from Patients with 
AIDS and at Risk for AIDS, 224 SCI. 500 (1984); Jörg Schüpbach, et al., Serological Analysis of a Subgroup of Human T-
Lymphotropic Retroviruses (HTLV-III) Associated with AIDS, 224 SCI. 503 (1984); M.G. Sarngadharan, et al., Antibodies 
Reactive with Human T-Lymphotropic Retroviruses (HTLV-III) in the Serum of Patients with AIDS, 224 SCI. 506 (1984). 
See also Lawrence K. Altman, New U.S. Report Names Virus That May Cause AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1984, at C1
(discussing the announcement of the American group’s findings). 
52 See A History of AIDS Up To 1986, supra note 16. 
53 See Mann, supra note 22, at 2. 
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(3) studies among geographically different populations illustrated the virus’s global reach.54
Nevertheless, public education was lacking. Rapid scientific development during the early years 
of the AIDS epidemic, the disease’s progression among heterosexuals, discovery of the viral 
cause, and subsequent democratization of HIV infection did not ease the public’s fear or convince 
them AIDS was not still the “gay plague”—a punishment for hedonists.55 Conflicting media 
reports, political jousting, and the knowledge gap between medical science and laypeople 
contributed to mass fear and panic that AIDS would spread uncontrollably during the mid-1980s. 
3. Precautionary Measures to Prevent AIDS Transmission: Some CDC Recommendations before  
District 27
Although the virus that causes AIDS was not discovered until 1983 and 1984, science 
and medicine had moved rapidly to respond to the new disease from the beginning. By the time 
New York City decided it would not automatically bar schoolchildren with AIDS from public 
classrooms, epidemiologists had already tied AIDS transmission to the transmission patterns of 
the well-understood hepatitis B virus.56 The medical community was aware of how to protect 
against AIDS exposure in high-risk environments, such as hospitals, as early as November 1982, 
when the CDC published the first clinical precautions for treating AIDS patients. The CDC’s
recommended precautions included common-sense measures such as handling blood samples with 
gloves, avoiding needle sticks, disposing of needles in puncture-resistant containers, and 
thoroughly washing hands after blood exposure.57 In March 1983, the CDC, Public Health 
Service, Food and Drug Administration, and National Institutes of Health jointly released 
consensus recommendations on preventing AIDS in the clinical setting. The announcement noted 
that while the cause of AIDS was unknown, its dispersion paralleled hepatitis B, which medicine 
knew to be transmitted by sex and blood. The prevention recommendations, therefore, centered on 
sexual contact, blood donation, and intravenous drug use—which remain essentially correct and 
largely unrevised today.58 By 1984, AIDS transmission was indisputably linked to blood, body 
fluids, sexual activity, intravenous drug abuse, and blood transfusions.59 And by 1985, the risk of 
casual transmission was considered by researchers to be infinitesimal. It had become clear that in 
the United States AIDS was almost exclusively transmitted through sexual contact, intravenous 
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55 See, e.g., Movie Stars Will Tell Everything – But Not That Finally the Spotlight is on Hollywood’s Taboo 
of Taboos – Will Public Care?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 28, 1985, at A12 (calling AIDS “the gay plague” and arguing 
that Rock Hudson’s diagnosis with AIDS outed him as a homosexual). 
56 See Jean L. Marx, New Disease Baffles Medical Community, 217 SCI. 618, 618-21 (1982) (“The spread 
of AIDS resembles that of hepatitis B virus.”); James R. Allen, Epidemiology in the United States, in AIDS: A BASIC
GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS 15, 22-23 (eds. Peter Ebbesen et al., 1984) (discussing transmission patterns of AIDS before the 
viral etiology was proven). 
57  CDC, Current Trends Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS): Precautions for Clinical and 
Laboratory Staffs, 31 MMWR 577, 577-80 (Nov. 5, 1982). 
58  CDC, Current Trends Prevention of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS): Report of Inter-
Agency Recommendations, 32 MMWR 101, 101-03 (Mar. 4, 1983). See Mason, supra note 19, at 1356. 
59 See Marx, supra note 56, at 618-20 (discussing possible transmission via blood, blood products, sexual 
contact, and contaminated needles); Allen, supra note 56, at 23 (discussing suspected modes of transmission); Jean L. 
Marx, Spread of AIDS Sparks New Health Concern, 219 SCI. 42, 42-43 (1983) (discussing AIDS transmission). 
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drug use with contaminated needles, blood or blood-product transfusions, or from an infected 
mother to her newborn child.60
B. A Year of Uncertainty and Fear: 1985 
Once medical science knew the disease’s cause, had a blood test to identify sufferers, 
and was confident of prevention measures, the question changed. “What is AIDS?” became 
“What do we do about it?” By 1985, more than a third of all AIDS cases in the United States were 
within New York City’s five boroughs.61 AIDS was the leading cause of death among New York 
men aged between thirty and forty.62 New Yorkers were “terrified of catching AIDS—and 
frequently misinformed about how it spreads,” according to a New York Daily News poll taken 
that September. Although almost everyone polled knew the virus that causes AIDS was 
transmissible through sex and blood, more than half the city’s population wrongly thought AIDS 
was transmissible by kissing. Only half the city knew they could not get the disease through 
sneezes.63
AIDS had become a public health crisis, and fear of the deadly disease gripped even 
medical workers. Some New York City hospitals had treated AIDS patients so badly that doctors 
were afraid to send their patients for treatment anywhere but a few friendly hospitals. St. Luke’s-
Roosevelt Hospital’s private rooms were half full of dying AIDS victims, and other hospitals with 
a good record of AIDS treatment similarly were overwhelmed. Hospitals became so crowded with 
AIDS patients in early 1985 that doctors had difficulty directly admitting AIDS patients, leading 
some doctors to thwart procedure and advise patients to go directly to the emergency room, 
where, by law, they could not be denied treatment.64 The fear of AIDS had also become the fear 
of gay men. Anti-gay discrimination was rampant, with reports of AIDS patients being summarily 
fired and at least one uninfected gay man being sacked for catching a cold.65
Ed Koch, New York City’s sharp-tongued, brash mayor was running for reelection, and 
he was being attacked on all sides for his response to the crisis. Victims’ rights advocates and gay 
leaders pounded the mayor for what seemed an inappropriately feeble response to the health 
crisis.66 Activist Larry Kramer’s “boiling hot . . . fiercely polemical drama”67 about AIDS and the 
                                                                
60 See James W. Curran, et al., The Epidemiology of AIDS: Current Status and Future Prospects, 229 SCI.
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61 See Rangel, supra note 18. 
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66 See, e.g., Carol Greitzer (N.Y.C. Council Member), Letter to the Editor, Ill Fated, N.Y. MAG., Apr. 8, 
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public’s reaction to the crisis, The Normal Heart, premiered at the Public Theater in April. 
Kramer minced no words when confronting the establishment—including public health officials, 
more cautious AIDS activists, and particularly Koch, whom Kramer attacked as failing to 
confront the AIDS crisis because the mayor was secretly gay himself.68 Koch, in his characteristic 
brusque manner, shot back that alleging the “administration has not done enough for AIDS 
victims, because . . . if we did more I would be linked with homosexuality” was “outrageous,”
“irrelevant,” but “[r]egrettably . . . [a] technique used in order to seek to slander an individual.”69
Nevertheless, Kramer “succeeded where the reasoned pleas of researchers and experts had failed, 
bringing the issue at last to the forefront of civic issues.”70 The Normal Heart put the heat on 
Koch, who, just hours before the play’s first preview show but after the script had circulated 
among media, hurriedly pledged millions of dollars to expand the city’s AIDS services.71
If The Normal Heart helped make AIDS a civic issue in New York City, Rock Hudson 
made it a personal issue for many Americans in the heartland. The country had grown up 
watching his films. An A-list star known for his “physical attributes, rather than his acting 
abilities,” Hudson was a considerable hunk who had “spent an inordinate amount of screen time 
with his shirt off.”72 On July 15, 1985, Hudson appeared haggard and gaunt at a public appearance 
with actress Doris Day, sparking rumors the actor was ill.73 A week later, he collapsed in a Paris 
hotel lobby and was hospitalized. On July 23, United Press International issued a bulletin that 
Hudson had “inoperable liver cancer possibly linked to AIDS,” setting off a media frenzy.74
Although Hudson’s spokesman denied the actor had the disease, the mere “possibility that Rock 
Hudson had AIDS . . . electrified the nation.”75 On July 25, ten days after his appearance with 
Doris Day, Rock Hudson’s spokesperson confirmed the actor was suffering from AIDS.76 That 
Sunday, “AIDS was on the front page of virtually every . . . morning paper in the United States.”77
Hudson’s announcement had instantaneously “startled the public” and propelled AIDS into 
heterosexual America’s living rooms.78
                                                                
68 See Sharon Churcher, Public Theater’s AIDS Play Has City Hall in a Flap, N.Y. MAG., Mar. 18, 1985, 
at 11 (reviewing The Normal Heart and Kramer on Koch).
69  Rangel, supra note 18.
70  SHILTS, supra note 16, at 556. 
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73 See, e.g., NBC Evening News (NBC television broadcast July 23, 1985) (reporting on Hudson’s illness 
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74 Rock Hudson, Reportedly Fatally Ill, Being Treated at AIDS Center in Paris, SEATTLE TIMES, July 23, 
1985, at A1 (the UPI bulletin). 
75  SHILTS, supra note 16, at 576. 
76 See Hudson’s Case Drawing National Attention to AIDS, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 26, 1985, at A1.
77  SHILTS, supra note 16, at 578. 
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Nevertheless, the syndrome had still not shaken its image as the gay plague in the 
country’s popular imagination. A nationwide column from July 28 that year is telling: “When it 
was announced that actor Rock Hudson is suffering from AIDS, the gay plague, decades of 
rumors about his sexuality came to an end. As only it can, the litmus test of acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome identified Hudson as a gay man.”79 Then came Ryan White, a teenage 
hemophiliac with star quality, who had contracted AIDS from a blood transfusion. White was 
thrust into the national spotlight in August 1985, when he was barred from his Indiana public 
school. On August 27, just three days before New York City’s announcement that it would not 
automatically bar children with AIDS from public schools, White appeared on ABC’s Good 
Morning America and became the face of AIDS for a generation.80
Ryan White’s story helped America begin to see AIDS as something different from 
hedonists’ just deserts. But the pendulum swung too far too fast. Rock Hudson’s announcement 
cracked the façade that AIDS was a problem just of homosexuals and drug abusers by raising 
suspicion and apprehension among heterosexual women who had long admired the silver-screen 
star.81 Ryan White showed the disease did not discriminate against innocents. Increased media 
coverage of babies infected in utero or during vaginal delivery meant heterosexual women were 
vulnerable. But public awareness of AIDS, particularly heterosexual transmission, “bypassed the 
real significance,” which was that the disease was concentrated among certain risk groups and 
linked with particular risky behaviors.82 The sudden media and public interest in AIDS during the 
spring and summer of 1985 was often sensationalist, verging on panicky. A public health official 
later described news coverage as “unwilling or unable to distinguish and articulate the shades of 
uncertainty that formed the reality of AIDS.”83 He went on to say, only somewhat jokingly, that 
he had “rather expected to see the front page of the New York Post proclaiming ‘Martians Land 
with AIDS.’”84 Later, during the District 27 trial, the Post did print a number of sensationalist 
banner headlines, although none attributed AIDS to aliens.85
II. SECRECY’S DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD: HOW GOOD POLICY GOT A BAD RAP 
The pervasiveness of AIDS in stigmatized groups through the mid-1980s had allowed 
the public largely to “distance themselves psychologically from the epidemic and those directly 
affected by it.”86 The Normal Heart, Rock Hudson’s announcement, and Ryan White’s activism 
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80 See KIRP, supra note 4, at 26-62 (discussing Ryan White’s situation and legal battle); Dirk Johnson, 
Ryan White Dies of AIDS at 18: His Struggle Helped Pierce Myths, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1990, at D10 (White’s obituary). 
81  Randy Shilts, Rock’s Role: Actor Turned Spotlight on AIDS Crisis, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 5, 1985, at 
19. 
82 See STEPHEN C. JOSEPH, DRAGON WITHIN THE GATES: THE ONCE AND FUTURE AIDS EPIDEMIC 139-40 
(1990). 
83 Id. at 78. 
84 Id.
85 See, e.g., Chris Olert & Paul Tharp, Kid Hookers in Times Sq. May Be Spreading AIDS, N.Y. POST, Oct. 
9, 1985, at 14; The AIDS Timebomb, N.Y. POST, Sept. 9, 1985, at 1. 
86  JOSEPH, supra note 82, at 93. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol19/iss4/1
2016] OPENING THE SCHOOLHOUSE DOOR TO THE AIDS VIRUS 271 
helped shrink that distance. Fear set in.87 During the same time period—in the first half of 1985—
New York City officials were considering whether children with AIDS would be allowed to 
attend public school and how the city’s public school system would treat HIV-positive children if 
allowed into the classroom. Although public health and school officials throughout the country 
were aware of the impending question, parents were not. Indeed, “[t]he very idea that a child with 
AIDS might attend school came a surprise to New Yorkers” when the city announced its policy 
that children with AIDS would not be automatically kept away from public school classrooms.88
Although the city’s answer was entirely appropriate—as Justice Harold Hyman put it in his 
District 27 ruling, “[T]he automatic exclusion of children with AIDS from the regular classroom 
would effect a purpose having no adequate connection with the public health, safety or 
welfare”—most parents never even knew there was an outstanding question about AIDS in 
schools.89
A. Developing New York City’s Policy Behind Closed Doors 
New York City’s non-exclusion policy was not without careful consideration. The city’s
public health officials had anticipated the question of how to educate children diagnosed with 
AIDS in as early as 1983. That year, science teachers asked the New York City Department of 
Health for guidance, in light of AIDS, on precautions for school laboratories.90  The Department 
of Health recommended schools take the same steps regarding AIDS as they would for hepatitis 
B—wash hands that come into contact with blood and clean blood spills with bleach, for 
example—even though hepatitis B was known to be more easily transmitted than the then-
unidentified causative agent for AIDS.91
In November 1984, the Department of Health’s pediatric AIDS expert, Dr. Pauline 
(Polly) A. Thomas, attended the first national pediatric meeting on AIDS.92 Pediatricians at the 
conference agreed children with AIDS could attend school, although some doctors suggested 
hepatitis-B-like precautions.93 Upon her return from the conference, Thomas suggested to 
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superiors that the Department of Health decide whether and what precautions New York City 
schools should take.94 During the 1984-85 school year, officials had already recommended three 
children with AIDS receive home instruction.95 In December 1984, Thomas “alerted her superior 
that ‘precedents set now may be difficult to break.’”96
The Department of Health continued to consider the appropriate policy on schoolchildren 
diagnosed with AIDS throughout the spring of 1985.97 On April 12, a New York City Board of 
Education deputy chancellor wrote Commissioner of Health David Sencer, requesting he issue 
written guidelines on the admission and attendance of public school children with AIDS.98 From 
April 15 to 17, Sencer and Thomas attended an international AIDS conference co-sponsored by 
the U.S. Public Health Service and the World Health Organization, where researchers unveiled a 
large number of newly completed studies on AIDS transmission, including controlled studies of 
infections in the family setting.99 The results uniformly found “no evidence for casual 
transmission of the virus within households.”100 A few weeks after the international conference, 
Sencer wrote back to the Board of Education that there would be no policy change regarding the 
children already on home instruction for the rest of the 1984-85 school year.101 Sencer went on to 
say the Department of Health and Board of Education should create citywide guidelines for the 
1985-86 school year.102 He requested the Board of Education appoint a representative, which it 
did on May 23.103
1. Inside City Government: Spring and Summer, 1985 
The Department of Health and Board of Education initiated joint meetings in June. Also 
in June, the CDC invited a group of consultants to Atlanta to “assist in the preparation of 
recommendations on the issues that would be raised” by people opposed to allowing children with 
HIV or AIDS into the classroom.104 Dr. Polly Thomas again represented the Department of 
Health.105 At the CDC meeting, medical experts unanimously agreed that such children could 
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attend school.106 On July 1, The New York Times reported New York City would promulgate 
guidelines that “could admit AIDS children to public school next fall.”107 Commissioner Sencer 
told the Times, “If they’re well enough to go to school, they’re not a risk to other children.”108 The 
process, Sencer said, would “take a lot of patient discussion, not only with the Board of 
Education, but with the community at large.”109 Shortly thereafter in early July, the Department of 
Health drafted guidelines “establishing a policy of fully integrating children with AIDS or related 
conditions into the public schools.”110
The Department of Health’s policy guidelines never substantively changed over the 
summer. They drew upon the best available medical science, largely from the studies Thomas had 
accessed at the two pediatric AIDS conferences, and included subsidiary policies for how schools 
would manage children with immunosuppression.111 The subsidiary policies exempted 
immunosuppressed students from certain vaccinations, set forth measures for schools responding 
to outbreaks of some airborne viral infections, such as chicken pox, and recommended 
precautionary measures for managing bleeding injuries and cleaning surfaces soiled by blood.112
Despite months spent gathering the best available research on AIDS transmission and developing 
detailed policy guidelines, the Department of Health and Board of Education never attempted to 
have that “patient discussion . . . with the community at large” Sencer had mentioned. Throughout 
the summer, New York City officials never even announced the policy-making process was 
underway. Mayor Koch was uncharacteristically silent. 
Perhaps not knowing the extent of the Department of Health’s policy development, Koch 
tapped three of New York City’s highest officials to develop the city’s final policy. Corporation 
Counsel Frederick A. O. (Fritz) Schwarz, Jr., head of the Law Department, Department of Health 
Commissioner David Sencer, and Board of Education Chancellor Nathan Quinones would have 
the final say.113 They agreed there was no reasonable medical basis for excluding children 
infected with the virus that causes AIDS from public schools. The Department of Health policy 
guidelines would remain intact. Yet “[n]ot one word” about the policy “was passed along to the 
community school boards” at any point in the process.114 Likewise, the public was left in the dark 
after the July 1 New York Times mention. 
Commissioner Sencer later claimed he was awaiting the CDC’s recommendations,115 but 
he had known their contents for months.116 Chancellor Quinones would later say he did not know 
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what the policy would be since the determination was Sencer’s.117 After local schools began to 
rebel against the city’s silence, Mayor Koch issued a press release saying Quinones was asking 
for Sencer’s recommendation.118 Behind the façade of public announcements, all three knew the 
policy would be one of not automatically excluding children diagnosed with AIDS from public 
school classroom. After all, Sencer and Quinones had, at Koch’s behest, worked together on the 
policy.119
2. City Officials Speak: August, 1985, Two Weeks before the Fall Semester 
New York City officials remained silent until August 27, when the mayor’s office issued 
a press release saying Chancellor Quinones had asked Commissioner Sencer for guidance on 
AIDS among school children and Sencer was consulting with experts “for advice on how the 
public school system should deal with children who have AIDS.”120 No mention of the 
community-wide discussion Sencer had earlier said would be necessary. No mention that a deputy 
chancellor had requested written guidelines in 1984. No mention of the Schwarz-Sencer-Quinones 
task force. No mention that the policy guidelines had been floating around the Department of 
Health for months.121
At a press conference at City Hall on August 29, Quinones told The New York Times
Sencer was still drawing up the policy on schoolchildren with AIDS.122 Quinones said he did not 
know the scope of the policy or whether it would conflict with the votes in the two Queens school 
districts.123 Within the hour, the CDC released a recommendation that children infected with the 
virus that causes AIDS generally be able to attend public school classes.124 After the CDC 
recommendations, Quinones again told reporters he was waiting to find out Sencer’s
recommendation.125
Finally, on August 30, Mayor Koch and city officials including Sencer and Quinones 
announced the policy drawn up by the Department of Health months earlier: New York City 
would not automatically segregate children diagnosed with AIDS from public school 
classrooms.126 Rather, the children would be screened on a case-by-case basis by a Department of 
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Health panel.127 City officials, particularly Sencer, caught flack in the form of a public relations 
disaster, five-week-long trial, and judicial opinion lambasting city officials’ misguided 
paternalism. 
B. Queens Parents React 
While New York City officials worked behind closed doors to create an adequate 
citywide policy on educating children with AIDS, the mood in Queens as the 1985 school year 
approached was “plague panic.”128 In July, Queens residents had rallied against the Department of 
Health’s attempt to house ten AIDS patients at a nursing home in the Neponsit neighborhood on 
the Rockaway Peninsula.129 Rockaway residents were in “near hysteria” over the plan.130 “They 
will be ambulatory . . . They will be walking in our streets,” one community leader reportedly 
shouted to a raucous crowd of around a thousand assembled against the city.131 The local 
community school board president, Samuel Granirer, spoke at the rally: The ten AIDS victims, if 
sheltered at the Neponsit nursing home, would be a threat to schoolchildren. “Let me tell you,”
Granirer pronounced, “they are going to be educated in safety.”132
Local residents and the nursing home sued to prevent the city from carrying out its plan. 
After Queens County Supreme Court Justice Harold Hyman—the judge who would preside over 
the District 27 trial—issued a temporary restraining order against the city, Mayor Ed Koch 
backed down from the Neponsit plan. But Garnirer’s campaign against the city was not over. A 
month after rallying against the Neponsit plan, the District 27 Community School Board President 
would lead parents’ crusade against integrating children with AIDS to public school 
classrooms.133
The community school boards in districts 27 and 29, both in Queens, had in mid-August 
called upon Chancellor Quinones to issue policy guidelines on AIDS.134 A response did not come 
quickly enough. On August 22, the District 27 Community School Board voted to classify AIDS 
as a communicable disease, which the local board said required “appropriate isolation.”135 District 
27, the city’s largest community school district, would keep children diagnosed with AIDS from 
attending public school there.136 Those children, if there were any, would receive home 
instruction. The community board’s reasoning was that the “cause and transmission” of AIDS was 
unknown,137 even though the retroviral cause had already been established (a test, albeit 
                                                                
127 Id.
128 The Real Fear of AIDS Musn’t be Plague Panic, Editorial, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 1, 1985, at 43. 
129  Joseph P. Fried, Roots of AIDS Boycott: Record of Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1985, at B1. 
130 See Ellis Henican & T.J. Collins, AIDS Haven Fought, NEWSDAY, Aug. 15, 1985, at 7. 
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 See Ellis Henican, Boycott Chief’s AIDS Crusade, NEWSDAY, Sept. 11, 1985, at 19. 
134 Jennifer Brier, “Save Our Kids, Keep AIDS Out:” Anti-AIDS Activism and the Legacy of Community 




Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
276 UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 19.4 
somewhat unreliable, was even available) and the modes of transmission were well known to 
medical experts by that time.138 The District 29 Community School Board soon followed suit.139
At a press conference on August 29, city officials announced they were developing a 
policy on schoolchildren with AIDS, which would apply in all five boroughs. Half an hour later, 
the CDC released its recommendation that children with AIDS not be automatically shut out of 
schools. Within a few hours District 27 had revolted. Superintendent Marvin Aaron told reporters 
that evening, “I cannot allow that child to enter the school.”140 New York City Chancellor of 
Education Nathan Quinones responded that the community school district was powerless to set its 
own policy. Aaron claimed the community school district’s ban on children with AIDS reflected 
“concern on the part of children, staff, teachers, everyone . . . . We just don’t know enough about 
the disease.” Quinones retorted, “Fear is not going to be the factor by which we will separate 
children,” and the city imminently would issue its own guidelines for public schools citywide.141
That announcement came from Koch, Quinones, Sencer, and Board of Education President James 
Regan at an August 30 City Hall press conference. The city’s policy would be to not 
automatically exclude children with AIDS from the classroom; rather, each child would be 
screened by a panel of experts.142
Even though the city’s August 30 announcement meant only that a child with AIDS may
attend public school, two school districts in Queens, District 27 and District 29, began planning 
for rebellion as soon as the city announced its non-exclusion policy.143
Mayor Koch only added to disarray and confusion by coming out in opposition to 
admitting children with AIDS into schools. At a September 1 mayoral primary campaign event, 
Koch made a bold but misinformed prediction: “I don’t believe you’re going to have any kids 
with AIDS ending up in the classroom.”144 The mayor qualified his prediction by explaining he 
would want to have children with AIDS attend public school if “you can establish that a child 
would be better off, and the child’s colleagues would be equally safe.” But Koch said he did not 
“believe you can establish that.”145 While conceding there was no scientific evidence of casual 
AIDS transmission, Koch tapped into Queens parents’ frustrations and told the crowd he would 
“rather err on the side of caution” and keep children with AIDS out of the classroom.146
District 27 Community School Board President Samuel Granirer further fueled parents’
passions. He thrust District 27 into the national spotlight at a September 4 press conference, 
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where Granirer was joined by Daniel Carter, president of Ryan White’s school board in Kokomo, 
Indiana.147 As children and parents picketed against the CDC’s recommendation and New York 
City’s policy, Carter called out public officials for being “cavalier . . . contradictory or 
inconsistent” and putting children at risk.148 Carter said public health officials’ attitudes were the 
same “folly of overconfidence” that preceded the Titanic’s voyage.149 The two school leaders 
called for a national moratorium to restrain children with AIDS from attending public schools.150
At the time, Ryan White was being forced to receive his seventh-grade instruction by telephone 
from his home. 
On September 5, five hundred parents convened a meeting at P.S. 63 in Ozone Park, 
Queens, to coordinate their efforts.151 One member of the District 27 Community School Board 
channeled Alabama’s segregationist Governor George Wallace and called on parents to “join us 
in standing in the schoolhouse door.”152 Two days later, and only two days before the start of the 
1985-86 school year, came the inciting incident for the District 27 drama: Chancellor Quinones 
and Commissioner Sencer announced one anonymous seven-year-old child who had been 
previously been diagnosed with AIDS, but who had been in school for the past three years, would
attend public school; and the child’s identity and school would remain confidential.153 Although 
they did not literally stand in the schoolhouse door, parents did post a warning at P.S. 60 in 
Woodhaven—”Enter at your own risk.”154
Between 10 and 20 thousand children stayed home from school that first day. Parents 
and pupils in Queens were on strike. Only 156 of more than 1,000 enrolled students showed up 
for the first day of class at P.S. 63.155 One protesting child was dressed as an AIDS victim and 
wheeled into the school in a plywood coffin.156 Hundreds marched through Queens chanting 
“Save our kids! Keep AIDS out!”157 Granirer, the community school board president, rallied a 
crowd of parents, exclaiming, “[T]he city fathers [are] ready to throw us into jail and we’re not 
going . . . The way to tell the city to get lost is to go to court.”158  District 27 (along with District 
29) filed suit and asked for a temporary restraining order prohibiting any AIDS-infected child 
from attending public school. 
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III. THE DISTRICT 27 TRIAL: A LEGISLATIVE HEARING IN A QUEENS COURTROOM 
The drama that played out in the District 27 litigation lasted months, as lawyers and the 
judge effectively conducted a legislative hearing in the Queens County Supreme Court. In the fall 
of 1985, two lawyers who wanted to educate the public, a judge who wanted to learn, and a 
parade of AIDS experts spent five weeks in the courtroom, detailing exactly what medical science 
did and did not know about AIDS and its causal virus. The ensuing judicial opinion would read 
like a textbook on the disease and how to develop public health policy in an epidemic. 
A. Schwarz Admonishes Judge: A Rocky Start159
The District 27 case began with a dramatic hearing on the temporary restraining order. 
New York Supreme Court Justice Harold Hyman initially refused to allow David Ellenhorn, an 
attorney hired to represent the child, to participate as intervenor in the case. Ellenhorn stormed out 
of the courtroom.160
The local schools’ attorney that day was Harry Lipsig, an eighty-three-year-old trial 
lawyer who had, in his fifty-year litigation career, become known as New York’s “King of 
Torts.”161 Lipsig’s protégé, Robert Sullivan, would lead the schools’ representation. On that first 
morning, however, Lipsig set the stage: AIDS research is “inconclusive,” the syndrome is a 
modern Black Plague, and to allow a child with AIDS in a public classroom is “a rash act.”162
New York City’s Corporation Counsel, Fritz Schwarz, made a “rare courtroom 
appearance” to argue the city’s position.163 Although Schwarz was a seasoned litigator on leave 
from Cravath, Swaine & Moore, one of New York City’s most prestigious white-shoe firms, the 
Corporation Counsel is head of the New York City Law Department and primarily serves an 
advisory and administrative counsel role. His presence in the courtroom added to the gravity of 
the hearing and emphasized how important the case was to the Koch administration.164 When 
Schwarz began to respond to Lipsig’s opening, Justice Hyman started yelling and wagging his 
finger.165 Risking a contempt citation, Schwarz rebuked the judge. “Judge, don’t yell at me, and 
don’t point your finger at me,” Schwarz later recalled saying. Hyman, then irate, got louder, 
continued yelling, and resumed his finger wagging: “Who are you?” Schwarz identified himself 
and said, “Judge, I’m telling you, stop yelling at me. Stop pointing your finger at me. Or we’re
not going to make any progress here.”166 Hyman and Schwarz both cooled off. Hyman denied the 
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schools’ request for a temporary restraining order, telling the parties he would “not interfere with 
the child’s being in school.”167 He set the trial to begin in three days.168
Justice Hyman’s decision on the temporary restraining order was not a foregone 
conclusion. Media-and-politics-driven AIDS hysteria had gripped Queens. Parents were 
protesting and picketing his courtroom. The elected judge was determining whether to allow a 
child infected with the deadly disease to attend school with those parents’ children. And Justice 
Hyman was facing pressure from his own family: His niece was a public school teacher, whom 
the judge disclosed had threatened to quit her job and leave the city if he allowed a child with 
AIDS to attend public school.169 Nevertheless, Justice Hyman was known as “fair-minded” and 
“not biased against the city,” so the city’s lawyers did not seek his removal.170 In his own words, 
Justice Hyman’s philosophy was, “You don’t have to respect me. Respect the robe.”171
Perhaps most importantly, Justice Hyman did not suffer from hubris. He admitted he 
knew virtually nothing about AIDS but was willing to learn.172 That willingness to learn allowed 
the parties to go beyond the papers alone and conduct a trial to develop a full record on AIDS. 
Together, Justice Hyman and attorneys on both sides of the case used the District 27 trial as a 
public education device to cut through media hype and political spin on AIDS and help close the 
gap between medical science and the public’s knowledge of the disease. 
B. Going Beyond the Narrow Scope of Review for New York Mandamus Actions 
New York law limits the questions that may be raised in mandamus actions,173 which are 
legal actions seeking to either compel an agency to perform a legal duty or challenge an agency’s
jurisdictionally sound, non-adjudicatory administrative determination.174 In mandamus actions,
the only permissible legal challenges are whether the decision maker “failed to perform a duty 
enjoined upon it by law”175 or whether the decision violated “lawful procedure, was affected by 
an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.”176 Thus, the primary 
questions before Justice Hyman were narrow: Did New York law create any substantive or 
procedural duty requiring the Commissioner of Health or Chancellor of Education to exclude any 
child with AIDS, AIDS-Related Complex, or the AIDS virus from public schools?177 Was the 
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decision to not automatically bar children diagnosed with AIDS from public schools arbitrary and 
capricious?178 Justice Hyman ultimately concluded the answer to both questions was handily 
“no.”179
As to whether the Commissioner of Health or Chancellor of Education was duty-bound 
to exclude schoolchildren with AIDS from public schools—historically termed a “mandamus to 
compel”—the school boards were required to show their “clear legal right” to relief, meaning 
there was no “reasonable doubt or controversy” as to the duty.180 The school boards argued 
“communicable disease” provisions in the New York City Health Code181 and New York state 
laws on public health and sanitation182 imposed a legal duty on New York City to isolate or 
exclude children with AIDS from public schools.183 At the time, however, AIDS had not been 
classified as a communicable disease in New York. The court concluded that while AIDS was 
confidentially reportable under a special state regulation, New York had “declined to . . . include 
AIDS on the list of communicable diseases,”184 resulting in AIDS not being a disease that would 
invoke City Health Code provisions on public school isolation or exclusion. The court held 
neither the Commissioner of Health nor Chancellor of Education had a legal duty to bar children 
with AIDS from public schools.185
Having determined neither the Commissioner nor Chancellor was legally bound to 
exclude children with AIDS from public schools, the court examined the rationale behind New 
York City’s discretionary decision to not do so. Whether the city had the legal power to exclude 
(or not exclude) children was not at issue in District 27. The premise of the school boards’
challenge was that city officials had the power to exclude children with AIDS from public 
schools, if they so chose. The city conceded its broad discretionary power under the New York 
City Charter and Health Code would have allowed the exclusion of children with AIDS from the 
classroom if the Commissioner of Health were to conclude that AIDS was communicable in 
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schools or children with AIDS would promote the disease’s spread. The school boards challenged 
the city’s refusal to exercise its discretion to automatically exclude children with AIDS.186
Once the Commissioner of Health made a discretionary decision to not automatically 
exclude children with AIDS from public schools, the only remaining question was whether the 
decision was arbitrary and capricious—put another way, was there any rational basis for the 
Commissioner’s decision.187 Generally, administrative challenges to an agency’s discretionary 
decision, like the one in District 27, get resolved on the papers alone. The judge simply reviews 
documents filed in court to decide whether the agency’s action was appropriate. Under New York 
law, the court’s review of a discretionary administrative decision within an agency’s jurisdiction 
is “limited to the grounds invoked by the agency,”188 so the reviewing court usually has no need 
for evidence or hearings beyond the papers parties file in court. Nevertheless, the reviewing court 
is empowered to take evidence or conduct hearings to ascertain the facts upon which the agency 
made its decision,189 which sometimes is necessary because administrative determinations are, by 
definition, without a formal record generated by adjudication. That is what happened in District 
27.
C. Rising Action and Climax: Attorneys as Teachers, a Judge as Schoolmaster 
District 27 ultimately went to trial because Justice Hyman believed “intense public 
interest and media attention” coupled with “highly emotional and controversial questions of civil 
rights, confidentiality, government, and school-aged children touched by one of the most 
publicized lethal infectious killers known to modern medicine,” in his words, “dictated that this 
court invoke the rarely utilized power to require a trial of the facts.”190 At one point during the 
trial, Justice Hyman motioned to reporters, television announcers, and sketch artists filling the 
jury box and proclaimed, “This is not a jury trial, but they are the jury.”191 The Queens courtroom 
was to be a public classroom. 
Reflecting on the case thirty years later, Fritz Schwarz, who argued for the city, recalled 
a meeting with the school boards’ attorney, Robert Sullivan: 
I did not want the case resolved on the papers. I wanted a full record to help 
educate the public. Before the trial, Bob Sullivan came to visit me at the 
Corporation Counsel’s office, probably to feel out his opponent. I told him I 
would try to fairly put forward facts on the science [about AIDS]. Sullivan, of 
course, wanted to win. But he either already wanted to take the case in that 
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direction or thought ‘we are in this together,’ because he did not push hard for a 
narrow record.192
By Sullivan’s account, the decision to have a full trial had already been made by the 
judge. “It was all Justice Hyman’s idea,” Sullivan remembered. Of course, both sides were eager 
to present their cases to the public. But it was “Hyman [who initially] said we were going to try 
this case in a public forum. He was upset with the city’s timeline for announcing the HIV-positive 
child would be in the regular classroom. Hyman said we were going to air the entire thing with 
experts, because press coverage would be huge. It was really going to be an effort to educate the 
public.”193
In a sense, the District 27 case became a noble cause for all involved to educate the 
public. According to Justice Hyman, “[F]rom the outset, the parties and the court recognized an 
opportunity to conduct a broad-ranging, aggregative inquiry calculated to advance the public 
education about AIDS.”194 To meaningfully achieve “this well-intentioned purpose,” as Justice 
Hyman described it, “the trial at times necessitated exploring matters not strictly relevant to this 
one child . . . [such as] the rationality behind those decisions [concerning school children with 
AIDS] as established by the medical and scientific evidence presented in court.”195
Schwarz also saw trial as an opportunity to educate Justice Hyman on the disease beyond 
what a papers-only review could achieve. As the trial progressed, Justice Hyman’s prejudices 
became evident, particularly when the judge would grill witnesses.196 “[I]t was tough to educate 
him,” Schwarz later recalled. “The [judge’s] biases were so strong at the beginning.”197 For 
example, early on, the judge posed the following hypothetical to one of the city’s medical experts: 
Suppose you’ve got a homosexual, he is reported to you, he’s on his last leg. 
Don’t you have a right for the safety of the general public to keep that man off 
the street, even though he may not be contagious merely by speaking to him or 
looking at him. But he is shown, as a homosexual to go out into that same field 
to commit the same homosexual act? He can infect 150 more people within 150 
days . . . . Now you’ve got his name, you’ve got his address, and yet the 
Department does nothing about picking this person up and seeing to it that he’s
either quarantined or something.198
One doctor testified he had treated hundreds of patients infected with AIDS, all but one 
of whom exhibited clear risk factors. The doctor told the court he suspected the one patient was a 
homosexual, although the patient denied it. Justice Hyman asked the doctor whether he 
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administered a “test” on the patient “to decide if he was a homosexual.”199 When the doctor 
explained to the judge there was no such test for homosexuality, Justice Hyman responded with 
disbelief.200 During recess, the judge told lawyers he “didn’t believe a word” the witness had said. 
“I know you can tell. I’ve been to Fire Island.”201 But to his credit, Justice Hyman acknowledged 
during trial, “This is going to be a tough decision to make, so I’m trying to learn, and that’s why 
I’m asking these questions.”202 Justice Hyman, the parents who packed the gallery, and reporters 
from across the nation were to learn about AIDS from a who’s who of AIDS experts, including 
AIDS research pioneers like Arye Rubinstein.203 The five-week-long trial would exhaustively 
explore social, medical, and political dimensions of AIDS. In doing so, the trial would also 
illustrate the complexity of public health policymaking during an epidemic. 
1. The Social Dimension of AIDS: Gauging Risk and Evaluating Evidence 
When it comes to risk, particularly risk to children, it is human nature to seek absolute 
assurances. Parents in Queens wanted to know their children would be “completely, totally safe,”
as one of the parents who picketed the District 27 hearings put it.204 Unfortunately, science and 
medicine do not spring forth from the head of a god, fully armed and ready for battle, like the 
Roman goddess Minerva.205 There rarely, if ever, are definite answers in public health because 
science and medicine are indeterminate.206 Public health defines risk “in terms of effects on 
populations, while the lay audience is concerned with individuals.”207 Evidence may be 
substantial but not “perfectly clear.”208 It may involve inherent unpredictability due to variations 
in natural systems.209 Human bodies are different. Viruses mutate. But policymakers must 
nevertheless make decisions. 
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The public and experts not only gauge risk differently, but also rely on different variables 
to evaluate evidence. Public health tends to develop policy based on science, statistics, objective 
expertise, and logic. The public often evaluates new risks based on intuitive reasoning, inferences 
based on experience, and what they already know.210  Science and medicine speak about risk as 
probability. For medical experts, some risk is acceptable, and probabilities change with 
knowledge or population characteristics.211 They tend to see a death as a death.212 The public 
wants to know true or false, yes or no, safe or not.213 Odds are not availing. How a person dies 
matters.214
The risk of transmitting AIDS through bodily fluids other than blood is an example of 
the rift between lay and expert definitions of acceptable risk. Bodily fluids were central to 
parents’ fears and the community school districts’ case.215 Jeanie Alferi kept her son out of school 
because she had raised him to “share[] his doughnuts, his cookies, and his juice.”216 Alferi feared 
her son “could get sick and die” if his good manners were to bring him into contact with saliva 
from a child with AIDS. Corrine Lebowitz, whose child was about to enter kindergarten, also 
worried about saliva and sharing: “Kids share a lot of things, and I just don’t want a kid with 
AIDS asking my kid if she wants to suck on a lollipop.”217 Parents’ fears were not irrational. 
Many news outlets created confusion by refusing to print or say “semen” or “vaginal secretions,”
instead reporting AIDS transmission as occurring by blood or euphemistic “bodily fluids.”218 The 
euphemism became particularly problematic for public understanding of AIDS when researchers 
isolated HIV in saliva in 1984.219 The New York Times reported the study as raising “real public 
health concerns.”220 Then, on the same day it released guidelines for integrating children infected 
with the AIDS virus into schools, the CDC announced a new study had isolated HIV in tears.221
                                                                
210  WILLIAM LEISS & DOUGLAS POWELL, MAD COWS AND MOTHER’S MILK: THE PERILS OF POOR RISK 
COMMUNICATION 26-27 (2nd ed., 2004); David P. Ropeik, Risk Communication: An Overlooked Tool for Improving 
Public Health, in PUBLIC HEALTH AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 1030 (Robert B. Wallace et al. eds., 15th ed., 2008). 
211  ANDREA KITTA, VACCINATIONS AND PUBLIC CONCERN IN HISTORY: LEGEND, RUMOR, AND RISK




215 See Opinion in Full, at 31-32, Dist. 27 Cmty. Sch. Bd. (discussing bodily fluids and AIDS 
transmission); Nelkin & Hilgartner, supra note 197, at 122. 
216  Jeffrey Page, Parents Voice Fear of AIDS in School, THE RECORD (Hackensack, N.J.), Sept. 11, 1985, 
at A1. 
217 Id.
218  JAMES COLGROVE, EPIDEMIC CITY: THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC HEALTH IN NEW YORK 139 (2011). 
219 See Jerome E. Groopman et al., HTLV-III in Saliva of People with AIDS-Related Complex, 226 SCI. 447 
(1984). 
220  Lawrence K. Altman, AIDS Studies Hint Saliva May Transmit Infection, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1984, at 
C1. 
221 See CDC, Recommendations for Preventing Possible Transmission of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus 
Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus from Tears, 34 MMWR 533 (Aug. 30, 1985) (describing the results of 
research on the virus in tears); Leslie S. Fujikawa et al., Isolation of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III from the Tears 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol19/iss4/1
2016] OPENING THE SCHOOLHOUSE DOOR TO THE AIDS VIRUS 285 
Inside the District 27 courtroom, “saliva, tears, sweat, vomit, [and] stools . . . were a 
major preoccupation.”222 Robert Sullivan, the lawyer for the school districts, brought parents’
fears to the fore. He pressed witnesses to state unequivocally that AIDS could not be transmitted 
by children in school. He concentrated on the public’s intuitive assessment of risk: Will schools 
be safe or not? Yes or no? What if . . . ?223 Sullivan asked experts if the disease could be spread 
through the practice of becoming blood-brothers/sisters.224 What about chewing on the same 
pencil? If children share food?225 Or get in a fight?226 What happens if there is urine on a toilet 
seat from a child with AIDS and another child sits in it? Everyone shares water fountains. Are 
they completely safe?227 He drew out uncertainties in the medical studies on AIDS transmission 
and sought to establish that city officials had unscrupulously minimized or neglected such 
possibilities when developing the non-exclusion policy and deciding to allow a child with AIDS 
to attend school with uninfected children.228
Corporation Counsel Fritz Schwarz focused on experts’ scientific assessment of relative 
risk: Some risk is acceptable because there are no definite answers in medical science.229
Knowledge changes. A “no risk” standard would grind public health to a halt.230  New York 
City’s witnesses never claimed to have assessed every “what if” scenario. Dr. Polly Thomas, the 
city’s chief expert on pediatric AIDS, told the court “there wasn’t any need to have a complete 
guarantee about all future interactions.”231 Commissioner of Health David Sencer spoke in public 
health terms, saying, “We have assigned a level of risk transmission by saliva to be so minimal 
that it does not have a practical implication.”232 The child’s attorney, David Ellenhorn, tried to put 
the risk of transmitting AIDS in the classroom setting into perspective, reminding the court 
“[t]here is a theoretical risk that the ceiling will collapse, and indeed, ceilings in rooms have 
collapsed, but such far-fetched possibilities are not a proper basis for making policy.”233
Put simply, the two sides in District 27 conceptualized risk contrarily. Parents and the 
community school districts sought guarantees. New York City’s public health officials could offer 
no absolutes. The parties’ different concepts of acceptable risk resulted in their talking past each 
other. The school districts wanted to know if AIDS could be transmitted in specific scenarios. 
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Policymakers “dismissed the scenarios as irrelevant—so unlikely to spread the disease they did 
not merit consideration.”234 Sullivan conceded “[t]he odds aren’t that great but . . . a parent is a 
funny kind of human being, and a parent isn’t much interested in odds.”235 The Department of 
Health and Board of Education, on the other hand, had to make policy choices based upon 
scientific evidence and expert evaluations of risk. The parties’ differing notions of risk ensured 
the evidence concerning transmissibility of the virus that causes AIDS would be scrutinized with 
a microscope. Parents and the school districts opposed New York City policymakers’ evaluation 
of research on AIDS and its transmissibility. Each side pressed expert witnesses on the adequacy 
of evidence underlying the city’s decision to not automatically prohibit children diagnosed with 
AIDS from going to public schools.236 Scientific uncertainty was on trial.237
Sullivan hammered experts on gaps in the medical and scientific understanding of AIDS 
transmissibility. Experts repeated that research was too new and could not rule out the possibility 
of HIV being spread at school.238 Knowing the virus had recently been isolated in saliva and tears, 
Sullivan asked doctors to rule out transmission through biting.239 Likely because proving a 
negative—that something will not occur—is impossible,240 the experts’ answers were cautious. 
Such transmission was “probably low,” “certainly possible,” “highly, highly improbable,” “highly 
unlikely,” “beyond remote possibility,” according to the doctors. 241 But they could not rule out 
entirely transmission by saliva or tears. Experts likewise could not say definitively that the disease 
would not be transmitted by blood in a classroom setting.242 “We don’t know the answers,”
Sullivan argued, and “[t]hey don’t know the answers either.”243 Sullivan thus contended that an 
oft-fatal disease, the transmissibility of which is uncertain, should not be allowed inside public 
schools. 
In opposition, Schwarz cast AIDS research as demonstrating that “mere casual contact,”
such as that occurring in schools, “does not present a risk” of transmitting the AIDS virus.244 The 
city’s position was that uncertainty is part and parcel with the nature of scientific inquiry. 
According to Schwarz, experts demonstrated the risk of transmission by bites or blood spills was 
“essentially nonexistent” and “theoretical” at most.245 To focus the court’s attention on the city’s
interpretation of AIDS research as supporting the non-exclusion policy, New York City’s lawyers 
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deftly asked witnesses for both sides a question to which they could not say no: “Isn’t it a fact, 
Doctor, that there is not a single reported case in the medical literature in which AIDS has been 
demonstrated to have been transmitted other than A) by sexual intercourse with an infected 
person; B) by injection of contaminated blood or blood products; or C) by an infected mother to 
her child before or during birth?”246
Justice Hyman “empathize[d] with the fears and concerns of parents for the health and 
welfare of their children within the school setting,” but he ultimately rejected the community 
school boards’ focus on theoretical or hypothetical modes of transmission.247 Instead, Justice 
Hyman highlighted consistencies in the evidence, much the same as had New York City. He 
wrote, 
Despite positive cultures from a variety of body fluids of infected persons, there 
is no concrete epidemiological evidence to date that the virus has been 
transmitted through contact with the saliva or tears of infected persons . . . . 
Reinforced by the total absence of documented cases of HTLV-III/LAV having 
been transmitted in any way other than by sexual intercourse, by injection of 
contaminated blood or blood products, including needle sharing, or by an 
infected mother to her child before or during birth, the experts unanimously 
agree that the virus is not transmitted by casual interpersonal contact or airborne 
spread . . . . After almost five years of experience, the surveillance data . . . as 
well as epidemiologic studies of families that include AIDS patients and of 
health-care workers who have been exposed to AIDS patients, speak strongly 
against transmission of AIDS through casual (non-sexual) contact.248
The judge noted community school districts had “[t]hroughout this case . . . focused their 
point of attack on the reluctance of medical experts to unequivocally state with certainty” that 
AIDS could not be transmitted except by already identified routes. He answered by highlighting 
that “it is not in the nature of medical science to be governed by a ‘no risk’ standard.”249 Justice 
Hyman acknowledged “the public, not recognizing the underlying medical tradition, is suspicious 
of the seeming uncertainty.”250 Taking a swipe at the school districts’ barrage of hypotheticals that 
made classrooms seem awash with blood, urine, and feces, Justice Hyman wrote that he 
understood parental fears but was “duty bound to objectively evaluate the issue of automatic 
exclusion according to the evidence gathered and not be influenced by unsubstantiated fears of 
catastrophe.”251
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2. Making Policy in an Epidemic: Mutually Assured Distrust 
The public’s fears, however unsubstantiated, were a natural response to a policy sprung 
on them by officials whom they did not trust and who they believed did not trust them. Trust is 
fundamental to effective public health policymaking.252 People tend to judge policy-related 
messages “first and foremost not by content but by source: who is telling me this, and can I trust 
them?”253 Trust requires openness.254 In the context of public health risks, the public “wants to 
hear . . . what those charged with risk management responsibility think ought to be done, and 
why.”255 When the responsible authorities have not adequately coordinated, do not effectively 
communicate with the public, or appear insensitive to the public’s concerns, trust diminishes.256 If 
the public does not trust the person or institution with policy-making responsibility, the public is 
not likely to trust the policy—however well-intentioned and rational it is.257
Mutual distrust between New York City officials and the public was a theme throughout 
the District 27 trial. The city described its policy-making process as thoughtful, deliberate, 
evidence-based, and rational.258 Centralized decision making was the most reasonable approach to 
a sensitive public health question involving civil rights of HIV-positive children. To open the 
process to the public would invite politics and emotion into the policy-making process. The city 
argued that the Department of Health’s policy was “the more conservative approach” and took 
into account “essentially nonexistent” risks, such as biting and nosebleeds.259 Board of Education 
Chancellor Nathan Quinones and Department of Health Commissioner David Sencer explained 
the city needed a uniform policy on schoolchildren with AIDS, overseen by citywide agencies.260
Schwarz contended the centralization of such policies was mandated by the state legislature, 
whose “judgment [was] to keep those somewhat emotional, potentially enormously divisive issues 
of what to do with someone who is different . . . out of the local authorities’ hands.”261 Secrecy 
was the means to the legislature’s end. 
The school districts’ attorney, Robert Sullivan, lashed out at city officials for 
bureaucratic arrogance and disdain for the public. He described Sencer as “authoritarian” and 
unwilling “even to discuss” the non-exclusion policy or decision to allow a child infected with the 
AIDS virus into the classroom.262 Sullivan cast Quinones as a puppeteer atop the “terrible 
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monument called 110 Livingston Street,” where the Board of Education was located.263 Sullivan 
maintained these two bureaucrats had developed the non-exclusion policy entirely shielded from 
public scrutiny, all the while treating local school boards as adversaries. That is why, Sullivan 
argued, they “waited until 36 hours before school opened” before announcing a child with AIDS 
would attend school—”to force that decision down everybody’s throat.”264 Sullivan contended 
that city officials were “big government . . . taking over” local matters.265 Whether parents and 
community school districts did not trust the central city policymakers or vice-versa, it is clear trust 
between New York City’s public health and education policymakers and the public had broken 
down. 
During the trial Justice Hyman lectured Quinones that had the city’s policy guidelines 
been in place earlier, “you would not be in the courtroom today.”266 In the court’s opinion, the 
Decentralization Law, which delegated some authority over schools to the community school 
districts, did not mandate prior consultation on the non-exclusion policy.267 Nevertheless, prior 
consultation was “implied from the spirit” of that law.268 Ultimately, Justice Hyman 
“admonished” the central Board of Education for “abdicating their public responsibility to the 
court.”269 According to Justice Hyman, New York City officials openly distrusted the public’s
ability to act reasonably in public health decision making and failed to disclose “routine”
information.270 The failure to engage with the public, at least through the community school 
boards, “besp[oke] the hostile attitude historically displayed towards community participation.”271
The breakdown in trust had cast doubt on the non-exclusion policy and subsequent decision to 
allow a child diagnosed with AIDS to attend public school. Nevertheless, Justice Hyman held that 
distrust and “the fact that some laypeople, both learned and unlearned, and some physicians of 
great skill and repute, may differ” in their beliefs as to the possibility of AIDS transmission in the 
school setting “[are] not reason[s] enough to declare the Commissioner’s policy to be without 
consideration or in disregard of the facts.”272
3. The Wall Comes Tumbling Down: Department of Health Doctor, Mother of Two 
The AIDS doctors and researchers who testified at the District 27 trial painstakingly 
detailed a wide range of issues related to the syndrome, including the newly discovered AIDS-
causing virus’s properties, the disease’s epidemiology and transmissibility, theoretical and 
hypothetical risks posed by infected children in the classroom, and findings from 
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contemporaneous and unpublished medical studies.273 Schwarz and Sullivan drew out the 
strengths and weaknesses of AIDS research, both in the court of law and court of public opinion. 
Justice Hyman would decide whether the policy was legally viable, but the people of New York 
City would ultimately get to decide whether it was politically viable during the November 5, 
1985, mayoral election. 
From the outset, Schwarz resolved to speak at least twice a day with media, including 
television crews, to further his goal of educating the public.274 Sullivan did the same.275 Although 
the lawyers used the public eye to posture, they summarized and characterized the experts’
testimony, thereby transmitting knowledge about the disease to the people. The public, 
particularly parents, paid attention. Take Carol Bouchard for example. She had two daughters in 
New York City public schools but did not know whether the school boards or city was correct. 
Like other parents, Bouchard attended many of the District 27 hearings, hoping to get answers. 
Speaking to a reporter midway through the trial, Bouchard said, “Some facts that came out today 
answered the questions I had from yesterday, and I hope answers that come out tomorrow will 
answer the questions I have today.”276 Schwarz and Sullivan had become “educators”; Justice 
Hyman, “schoolmaster to the city.”277 The court’s noble cause was succeeding. 
For Justice Hyman, “When I found out that AIDS could not be transmitted by casual 
contact, my fears about contagion went up in smoke.”278 The experts’ testimony had convinced 
the judge that while the city’s decision-making process was flawed, its decision was not. In the 
public’s mind, however, the trial’s climax occurred during Robert Sullivan’s cross-examination of 
Dr. Polly Thomas, the pediatric AIDS specialist who worked for the New York City Department 
of Health. Thomas was also the mother of two small children. When Thomas testified she 
“considered it unlikely” the AIDS virus could be transmitted through a child’s bite, Sullivan 
attempted to back her into a corner. Speaking in the context of children biting one another at 
school, Sullivan asked Thomas, “If your child was bitten . . . would you want to have your child 
have that blood test as a precaution, to know if your child had contracted the AIDS virus?”279
Sullivan expected the doctor to announce the policy for her home was different from the policy 
for New York City schools; however, Thomas had thought this question through already and 
determined she did not want to live in a world where every scrape requires a blood test.280 Her 
response to Sullivan’s hypothetical was an unqualified, “I would not.” The spectator gallery 
gasped in shock.281
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D. Resolution: A Most Meticulous Opinion 
The District 27 trial ended in October 1985, but the court did not issue its opinion until 
February 1986. Schwarz later recalled, “Everyone was sure that we were going to lose.”282 A poll 
taken in 1985 showed a majority of New Yorkers wanted the city to lose.283 Even among political 
elites, sentiment ran against the non-exclusion policy: Mayor Koch hosted a dinner at Gracie 
Mansion during the trial, and he informally polled the guests about the city’s position. The only 
people who supported the city’s position were Schwarz, his wife, and historian Robert Caro. 
According to Schwarz, other guests, including media mogul Rupert Murdoch and his wife, 
worried the city’s position would endanger children’s lives.284 However, at least one person was 
not sure the city would lose—Robert Sullivan. He recalled that before the trial was over, Justice 
Hyman told him the schools were going to lose but the public education was not complete. So the 
trial went on.285
In February 1986, the court released its eighty-two page opinion. District 27 was the first 
case in the United States to explore factual and legal issues relating to AIDS in such depth.286 As a 
threshold matter, Justice Hyman upheld New York City’s non-exclusion policy as not arbitrary 
and capricious, meaning the policy was on solid footing.287 Although Hyman’s legal analysis 
could have ended there, the judge went beyond what was strictly required to uphold the city’s
non-exclusion policy. Sending a signal to policymakers and other courts, Hyman analyzed New 
York City’s policy in light of the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and federal 
statutory rights provided by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. He ruled that had New York City 
excluded children with AIDS from public schools, such a policy would have violated the 
children’s constitutional and statutory rights.288 Hyman’s far-reaching analysis of federal rights 
influenced many later court cases,289 but the judge’s opinion in District 27 went even further. 
True to his goal of educating the public, Justice Hyman’s District 27 opinion 
methodically and meticulously summarized the then-current state of AIDS research. In the five-
and-a-half pages he deemed an “Introduction” to his opinion, Hyman explained what AIDS is: 
“AIDS is a clinical diagnosis of a disease complex characterized by a collapse of the body’s
natural immunity against disease.” He continued, “There is no known cure for AIDS at present,”
but a newly discovered retrovirus had been identified as “the probable causative agent responsible 
for AIDS.” Hyman detailed the virus’s clinical progression from initial infection through 
incubation, presentation of AIDS symptoms, and, eventually, death. In essence, Hyman wrote a 
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public health pamphlet on AIDS, based on testimony at trial and using language generally 
accessible to the public—all before even mentioning the case before him. “In short, it is the 
HTLV-III/LAV virus, and the syndrome known as AIDS,” Hyman wrote in his introduction, “that 
is contagious or transmissible, infiltrating and sabotaging the body’s center for disease control, 
fomenting chaos and immunological anarchy.” A virus—something the public could relate 
with.290
IV. DISTRICT 27’S DENOUEMENT: WHEN SCIENCE, LAW, POLICY, AND POLITICS 
CONVERGE 
New York City’s policy of non-exclusion and its successful defense in District 27 helped 
pave the way for school districts across the United States to similarly adopt policies allowing 
HIV-positive children to attend public schools. By taking a deep, critical look into the best 
available medical science and research, District 27 established the dearth of evidence that AIDS 
was casually transmissible in the school setting. The case helped bring AIDS from society’s
fringes into the forum of public discussion. It remains a learning tool for understanding how 
public health and politics often collide—and how policymakers can soften the impact. 
Public health policy broadly includes law, regulation, agency guidelines, budget 
priorities, and judicial determinations.291 It is primarily aimed at preventing and controlling 
disease and promoting the health of the populace.292 Ideally, public health policy is based on the 
best available science.293 In practice, the policy-making process “is complex and depends on a 
variety of scientific, economic, social, and political forces.”294 Adding to the complexity is a 
democratic paradox,295 which makes litigation likely. The state’s police power, meaning its power 
to restrict individual freedom in pursuit of public welfare, runs against constitutionally protected 
individual rights,296 yet the public relies on the state to protect individuals from harms they cannot 
themselves fend off.297 Legally, the state has a great deal of power to restrict individual rights to 
protect the public health.298 Politically, however, policymakers may be more constrained.299 As a 
result, public health officials “must constantly struggle to balance the interests of the community 
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as a whole . . . and individual autonomy.”300
One example of the democratic paradox occurred in the early days of the AIDS 
epidemic, when public health officials moved to close bathhouses. Bathhouses were, in essence, 
social clubs where men could go to engage in sex with other men.301 They were hotbeds for 
pestilent behavior.302 Epidemiologically, the question was not difficult to answer. Sexual behavior 
in bathhouses, including multiple sex partners in a single visit, allowed for explosive transmission 
of sexually transmitted diseases, including AIDS.303 People who went to bathhouses “simply were 
more likely to be infected with a disease—and infect others—than a typical homosexual on the 
street.”304 Despite public education on safe sex practices, a small minority of men continued to 
patronize bathhouses and engage in unprotected sex with multiple partners.305 Bathhouses were 
indisputably conduits for AIDS transmission. Nevertheless, some gay activists saw closing the 
bathhouses as dialing back civil rights victories for the LGBT community.306 In cities like San 
Francisco and New York, activists organized against proposals to close them. Political activism 
effectively limited public health from acting quickly to respond to the clearly demonstrated link 
between AIDS transmission and sexual encounters at bathhouses.307 As AIDS pioneer Dr. 
Anthony Fauci later wrote, “[I]t was impossible to separate HIV science from HIV policy” in the 
early to mid-1980s.308
Law, public health policy, medicine, politics, and social values converged in District 27.
That the convergence occurred in public primary school only made the situation more volatile. 
New York City officials were in a no-win scenario. To automatically exclude children from 
public schools would have brought allegations of civil rights violations. To not automatically 
exclude the children resulted in a lawsuit alleging, in effect, New York City was putting children 
who were not infected with HIV at risk. To remain silent was not an option because Mayor Ed 
Koch was in the middle of a reelection campaign and being pressed on the issue by reporters. 
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Regardless of New York City’s policy, litigation was inevitable. Knowing litigation was 
inevitable, however, should have prompted public health officials to consider whether decide-
announce-defend or engage-interact-cooperate would lead to a better result. City officials chose 
the former course of action and left public health education to Corporation Counsel Fritz 
Schwarz, who masterfully used the courtroom as a classroom. Nevertheless, educating the public 
after the fact and through the adversarial legal process seems indirect at best. Had New York City 
officials chosen to engage, interact, and cooperate with the public during the decision-making 
process, much of the District 27 trial could have been avoided. 
What does District 27 teach about policymaking involving contentious social issues such 
as AIDS? First, courtrooms must sometimes become classrooms and lawyers may have to educate 
both the fact finder and public at large. Second, a level of scientific uncertainty is tolerated in 
public policy matters. Third, reflexive secrecy in the decision-making process may undermine 
even the best public policies. Although the District 27 opinion addresses each proposition, the 
opinion’s focus on secrecy and democratic ideals is worthy of critical elaboration and comparison 
with public policy best practices. 
A. Balancing Secrecy and Transparency in Public Policy: Democratic Idealism 
If governments in the United States “deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the 
governed”309 and consent “is not meaningful unless the governed are informed about their 
government and its leaders,”310 could New York City officials justify the secret decision-making 
process that resulted in the non-exclusion policy at issue in District 27?
Justice Hyman seemed to think not. He too recognized the fundamental idea that 
“consent of the people” implies “the people have the right to know what these officials are 
doing.” He castigated the city for “tak[ing] great pains to establish that the letter of [New York’s
public access laws] does not apply in this case,” all the while “miss[ing] the spirit of the law.”311
As often happens when a coterie of government officials develops policy in secret, New York 
City officials’ well-intentioned purpose backfired. “Instead of educating and inspiring the 
confidence and trust of the public, respondents left them frustrated and hostile in the face of such 
an emotionally charged issue,” Hyman wrote. “It is these public officials themselves who 
predictably, although perhaps unwittingly, let loose the forces of anxiety and fear.”312
Justice Hyman characterized city officials as working under the “notion that they knew 
what was best and would make all the decisions for everyone’s good. Believing this, they acted in 
imperious fashion . . . behind a cloak of secrecy.”313 Indeed, “[n]ot one word about the policy that 
was taking shape” escaped; and no information “was passed along to the community school 
boards during all these months.”314
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Why such secrecy? Perhaps city officials were seduced by secrecy’s promise of 
efficiency. After all, acting in secret “seems easier and faster . . . limits challenges and pesky 
questions . . . [and] fosters illusions of grandeur.”315 According to Deputy Chancellor of 
Education Joseph Sincenti, New York City was “setting the precedent for the country. Never 
mind that we catch all the flack. We’re doing the right thing.”316 Of course, secrecy often is 
necessary. Public health policies, especially those fraught with social and political value 
implications, need to be carefully considered to balance public welfare, individual rights, and 
best-available scientific data.317 While the committee’s secrecy was justifiable—public hearings 
could risk the public health decision becoming a political one—the mayor’s silence was not. Had 
local school boards or principals on the ground in New York City schools been aware the city was 
developing a policy on schoolchildren with AIDS, the likelihood of a vitriolic public reaction 
might well have been reduced. The local boards would have become a part of the process, thereby 
increasing locals’ trust of the city’s policy. Furthermore, they would have been armed with the 
same data as city officials, which would have allowed local district officials to become a conduit 
for educating parents and teachers about AIDS. 
Transparency in policymaking has a cathartic effect. As Fritz Schwarz would later write 
in a law review article with Eric Lane, sunshine in policymaking helps “diminish any sense that 
[policymakers are] ‘acting upon’ rather than ‘acting for’ the public.”318 To be fair, Schwarz and 
Lane were discussing the value of transparency in rewriting the New York City Charter—its 
constitution—over the course of a year in 1989. Nevertheless, the principle remains: 
Transparency and public debate “make[] narrow-minded views more difficult to express,”
“sharpen[] [internal debate] because of . . . public feedback,” and help make final policy “different 
and better” than earlier proposals because “we all need to learn, we all need to grow, we all need 
to develop, we all need to improve our ideas, and . . . we will learn from the wider New York City 
public.”319 And the public will learn from the policymaking process. 
Such openness did not occur in 1985. Mayor Koch kept the public and local school 
boards in the dark. There was no information feedback. There was no learning. As Justice Hyman 
put it in the final paragraph of his opinion in District 27,
The result was a five-week trial during which [the] court, with the able 
assistance of eminent counsel, attempted to fill the educational void by 
surfacing information which should have been provided to the public as a 
matter of routine. Had the public officials involved trusted the people, much of 
this trial could have been avoided. In a democracy, unanimity is never to be 
expected. However, open forthright conduct by public officials should avoid 
much of the distress and acrimony which has surrounded this litigation.320
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B. Balancing Secrecy and Transparency in Public Policy: Evidence-Based-Policy Realism 
Justice Hyman’s analysis of the policy-making process in District 27 is apt but 
unavailing. Democratic values are inherently fluid. Precisely because government derives its 
powers from the people it represents, the state can hardly sit idly by in the face of a public health 
threat and allow the democratic process to determine a course of action. The state must act 
swiftly, based on expertise, to protect the general welfare.321 But policymakers must be cognizant 
of the social and political aspects of their decisions. 
1.  The New York City Trust Deficit 
In 1985, New York City policymakers faced a serious trust deficit. Ed Koch and David 
Sencer were being hammered on all sides for the city’s response to AIDS. Among the gay 
community, New York City was not doing enough to combat the disease and shield AIDS victims 
from discrimination. When public health officials did attempt to provide for AIDS victims—for 
example, when the city attempted to transfer to a Queens nursing home ten AIDS patients who 
were “too sick to go home and not sick enough to be hospitalized”—local communities accused 
officials of exposing them to a “dire health threat.”322
Further complicating the picture was friction between the New York City Board of 
Education and local community school districts. Decentralization of the city’s school system had 
divided decision-making between the Board of Education, which was empowered to make policy 
on issues with citywide impact, and local school boards, which were to be responsive to local 
concerns.323 By the mid-1980s, many people accused the local boards of being too political and 
prone to abuse and excess. The local boards and many parents believed the Board of Education 
was bureaucratic, cold, and unresponsive to community needs.324 Indeed, at the height of the 
AIDS crisis, New York City officials were skeptical that the public would respond rationally to 
any AIDS policy, and the public did not trust that “arrogant New York City bureaucrats” were not 
simply “bullying the citizenry.”325
New York policymakers had an uphill battle from the start; however, some factors within 
city officials’ control could have boosted trust in public health officials and alleviated many of the 
fears that made the non-exclusion policy so contentious. First, citywide public officials tapped to 
develop New York City’s policy regarding schoolchildren diagnosed with AIDS operated behind  
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a veil of secrecy, keeping even local school boards in the dark. Second, the secret decision-
making process precluded the city from assessing parents’ values and meaningfully educating 
them before the policy was announced. 
2. Build Trust Through Transparency 
Distrust can hamper even the most responsible public health policies.326 People want to 
know about public health risks.327 Although a particular individual will perceive a risk uniquely 
depending on his or her life circumstances,328 people are generally more accepting of risks and 
uncertainty if they know what public health authorities think should be done and why.329  On the 
other hand, secrecy fosters distrust and doubt.330 Distrust and doubt lead to suspicion: If there is 
nothing to hide, why fear transparency? Suspicion, apprehension, and concern for safety “feeds 
upon itself and . . . may be amplified to the point where credible and pertinent information makes 
no difference” to the public.331
To build and maintain trust throughout the policymaking process, officials should adopt 
a presumption of openness.332 But transparency is not a hothouse plant. It cannot be transplanted 
the same into every policymaking process, without consideration of context.333 A presumption of 
openness does not mean the entire decision-making process should be carried out in public 
hearings. To do so likely would grind public health to a halt and create undue politicization of the 
policymaking process. Nevertheless, public health officials must think ahead to decide “when and 
how to engage with external stakeholders.”334 From April to August 1985 in the New York City 
Department of Health, Board of Education, and City Hall, such thinking apparently never 
occurred. If such thinking did occur, it wrongly resulted in a black-box decision-making process. 
When was the appropriate time to involve the public in the policymaking process? 
Between mid-July and the first week of August 1985 at the latest. By that time, Department of 
Health experts had been gathering evidence and contemplating the appropriate policy for more 
than six months.335 By that point, Commissioner of Health David Sencer knew the substance of 
the U.S. Centers for Disease Control’s forthcoming policy guidelines.336 The Board of Education 
had been consulting with the Department of Health to develop the policy for more than six weeks, 
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and the policy was substantively complete.337  Sencer later contended decision makers were not 
unanimous during the policymaking process and that “it made no sense to wash our dirty linen in 
public.”338 Although plausible, such distrust of the public only feeds public distrust of 
policymakers and, therefore, the policies they make. Indeed, studies have shown policymakers 
can increase trust by “[a]dmitting to uncertainty, or facilitating public understanding of science as 
a ‘process.’”339 Given that New York City’s central authorities already faced a trust deficit in 
1985 and the public was becoming increasingly frightened of AIDS,340 some public outcry over 
the city’s mere consideration of allowing a child with AIDS into public school was inevitable. 
Nevertheless, policymakers must recognize transparency’s potential for building public trust. 
Had New York City officials been more transparent, public health and school authorities 
could have educated the public during the summer before school began. Instead, policymakers left 
the city’s lawyer to defend the non-exclusion policy and educate the public after the fact. In doing 
so, policymakers undermined the public’s trust in the policy and its scientific basis. As Dr. Louis 
Cooper, a witness for New York City, put it at trial, “If one of the expected outcomes of any 
public process is public trust and comfort and security about outcome, then, in hindsight, that 
process didn’t achieve that goal.”341
How should New York City have engaged the public? Public hearings would have risked 
inappropriate political influences in what was essentially a public health question. Notice-and-
comment rulemaking was one option, although facing an accelerated decision-making timeline 
may have made that process less viable. At the least, once they had assembled evidence and 
sketched out New York City’s policy, the Board of Education and Department of Health could 
and should have announced the question of whether children diagnosed with AIDS would be 
allowed in public schools was on the table. Although Sencer mentioned the issue in a July 1 New 
York Times interview, he never followed up with the public discourse he promised. The people in 
a democracy have a right to be informed. Had city officials announced a joint committee of the 
Board of Education and Department of Health had been considering a non-exclusion policy, they 
could have communicated the evidence upon which the committee based its draft policy. But once 
the policy was final, the public was “unlikely to be assuaged simply by reassurance” from experts 
and policymakers about the risk (or lack thereof) posed by a schoolchild with AIDS.342 During the 
summer, the public was hungry for information. Sencer failed to use his bully pulpit to feed them 
relevant information. His one reported statement in July was that the policy discussion would 
necessarily involve the public.343 That never happened. 
Risks are more acceptable when policymakers explain what might happen, acknowledge 
public fears, explain what evidence would exist if the feared risk existed, and describe how sound 
medical science has not found that evidence.344 Involving the public as a whole was not the only 
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way to pursue transparency. New York City’s public school decentralization had created a system 
for ensuring, through local board elections, the public would have representatives in school 
governance. To reduce the chance of over politicizing the policymaking process, the Board of 
Education and Department of Health could have involved the community school boards. The 
community school boards, in turn, would have been poised to educate and disseminate 
information to parents once the citywide policy was finalized and announced. Although not every 
public health decision will have a built-in mechanism for involving the public or their 
representatives, New York City did. City officials should have utilized it. 
3. Value Public Values 
Transparency is a first step, but it should be paired with meaningful consideration of 
public concerns. The virtuous decision is not always going to be politically popular. Policymakers 
must be forward thinking and assess difficulties in advance.345 To ignore the public altogether or 
simply assume the public is not fit to rationally discuss a health policy vis-à-vis the risk to which 
it pertains may endanger the policy by amplifying anxieties and mistrust.346 Even the best-
intentioned public health policies with strong scientific bases may be opposed by people who 
perceive the policies as adversely affecting them.347 Simply put, the public may have fears that do 
not comport with public health experts’ views of the relevant risks.348 It is not enough to rely on 
scientific objectivity and simply write off the public as irrational. Neither is it correct to act on the 
assumption that laypeople would change their perceptions of risk if only they “knew more about 
science and ceased to be in a state of a knowledge deficit.”349
Policy officials and public health experts must consider what the affected public cares 
about.350 Officials and experts who “fail[] to anticipate common misunderstandings . . . can 
inadvertently reinforce them.”351 It may be that the public’s concerns stem from insufficient 
knowledge to evaluate a potential public health risk, in which case officials can identify the 
misperceptions and correct them through education.352 Or the public may understand the scientific 
basis for a public health policy but reject it on an ethical or moral basis,353 in which case officials 
can develop messaging that best responds to public concerns or work with affected people to 
reach a mutually acceptable policy.354 In either instance, public health policymakers must 
meaningfully involve the public to some degree in public health matters in order to bridge the gap 
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between experts and laypeople.355  It is critical that policymakers “[a]ccept and involve the public 
as a partner” in public health matters.356 And doing so, as Justice Hyman implied in District 27,
fosters informed discussions crucial to democracy.357
The U.S. public was not sympathetic to AIDS victims in 1985. A nationwide poll in 
December found 1 in 3 Americans favored quarantining people diagnosed with AIDS, while 1 in 
7 supported tattooing AIDS victims with a sort of permanent scarlet letter.358 Regarding the 
formation of the non-exclusion policy, a high-ranking New York City official explained, “We 
weren’t going to do this by votes.”359 Policymakers excused their opaqueness as resulting from 
“not wanting to cause a panic,” which might have ended in a politically popular but medically 
unfounded policy of exclusion.360 Justice Hyman, on the other hand, criticized the city’s
presumption of impending panic as “not [being] supported by any evidence.”361 In fact, Justice 
Hyman suggested that precisely by not involving the public, city officials had themselves “let 
loose the forces of anxiety and fear.”362
For many parents of New York City public schoolchildren in 1985, the city’s decisions 
not to automatically exclude children diagnosed with AIDS from the classroom and to 
affirmatively admit one infected child abruptly removed the parents’ ability to protect their 
children from a potentially deadly disease. From a parent’s perspective, a disease that had seemed 
to only threaten others was suddenly a risk to them. Not just them—their children.363 Parents’
fears were justifiable. After all, the virus that causes AIDS had recently been isolated in saliva and 
tears. News reports implied that isolating the virus in saliva and tears meant AIDS could be 
transmitted through those routes.364 People tend to fit new information about potential hazards 
into what they already know, which meant parents reasoned their children would be at risk if they 
were to share a lollipop or console a friend, for example.365
Because New York City officials chose not to work with and educate the public on the 
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risks a child diagnosed with AIDS might pose in the classroom, parents were left to make 
inferences based on their own understandings.366 Take Maria Gallo as an example. It was a great 
irony to her that when a “kid vomits in school, they send him home. He gets a skin rash, they send 
him home . . . . And if the kid has AIDS, they say no problem, just send him in.”367 Had city 
officials involved the public as partners and tried to “understand and respect the validity of the 
intuitive reasoning people use to gauge risk,” public education could have dissipated many 
parents’ similar concerns by filling in knowledge gaps with useful content and information 
targeted to public fears.368 Instead, New York City officials took a mom-knows-best approach to 
developing the non-exclusion policy and thrust it upon the public without sweetening the pill 
through public input. 
V. EPILOGUE 
The United States has lost more than 650 thousand women and men to HIV/AIDS since 
the disease was first documented.369 More than 1.2 million Americans are living with HIV 
infection. Another 40 to 50 thousand people in the United States will seroconvert this year.370
But much has changed in the three decades since District 27 Community School Board v. 
Board of Education. In a 1987 opinion by Justice William Brennan, the Supreme Court ruled that 
people with infectious diseases are protected by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act from 
discrimination in housing, education, transportation, health care, jobs, or any other federally 
funded program.371 In 1990, only months after Ryan White died, Congress passed the Ryan White 
CARE Act, which now provides $2.3 billion a year to help more than half a million HIV-positive 
Americans cope with the disease.372 In 1992, the Americans with Disabilities Act began to take 
effect, broadly prohibiting private discrimination against HIV-positive people and further 
protecting seropositive school children from discrimination in public and private schools. Then, 
during the mid-1990s, highly active antiretroviral therapy became available, effectively reducing 
AIDS death rates and more than doubling life expectancy from 10.5 to 22.5 years after HIV 
diagnosis.373 Behavioral and educational programs developed in the aftermath of debates like 
those in District 27 have helped the United States halve the rate of new HIV infections since the 
mid-1980s.374 And over the past few years, pre-exposure prophylaxis has shown promising results 
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for decreasing HIV transmission among those substantially at risk of HIV infection.375
Unfortunately, many of the same fears and misconceptions that plagued Queens’ parents 
in 1985 persist. In 2011 Abraham Smith sued Milton Hershey School in Pennsylvania for 
allegedly discriminating against the HIV-positive schoolchild. Milton Hershey School is a cost-
free, private school founded by an American chocolatier to “provide a positive, structured home 
life year-round” for low-income students.376 Milton and Catherine Hershey wanted to “help 
children gain the skills to be successful in all aspects of life.377 Abraham Smith was the 
pseudonym for a thirteen-year-old honor roll athlete from Delaware County, Pennsylvania. 
Abraham is HIV-positive and in 2011 was taking five pills plus a vitamin each day to treat his 
illness but required no special accommodation at his public school. That year, he applied to 
transfer from his public school to the acclaimed Milton Hershey School. When Abraham’s
caseworker called to inquire about the school’s policy regarding HIV-positive applicants, Milton 
Hershey School said it “did not take kids like that.”378
School officials refuted the assertion. According to them, the woman who said Milton 
Hershey School did not accept HIV-positive children had no authority; and officials told Abraham 
they would consider his application. After Abraham sent the school his application and a copy of 
his medical records, Milton Hershey School officials said the boy would “not be considered for 
possible enrollment . . . [because his] needs [we]re beyond the scope of the Milton Hershey 
School programs.”379 With help from the AIDS Law Project of Pennsylvania, Abraham sued 
Milton Hershey School, and the U.S. Department of Justice launched an investigation. Despite the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and the fact that Abraham was already enrolled in public school 
without accommodation or incident, Milton Hershey School told reporters it could not 
“accommodate the needs of students with chronic communicable diseases that pose a direct threat 
to the health and safety of others.”380 The school’s reference to unsubstantiated health and safety 
threats posed by Abraham was eerily reminiscent of the District 27 and 29 school boards’ failed 
arguments in District 27. The difference, however, is that schools in New York in 1985 could 
rationally argue not enough was known about HIV to admit an infected child. Milton Hershey 
School in 2011 knew better. Under a settlement agreement with Abraham and the Department of 
Justice, Milton Hershey School had to pay the child $700,000, adopt and enforce an anti-
discrimination policy for students with disabilities, provide better training to faculty and staff on 
anti-discrimination laws, and pay an additional $15,000 fine to the United States.381
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Arkansas’ Pea Ridge School District went even further than Milton Hershey School. In 
2013, Pea Ridge Superintendent Rick Neal shut the public schoolhouse gates to three disabled 
Arkansas schoolchildren on the mere suspicion they may be HIV-positive.382 When they showed 
up for school, the children were “set aside” until their foster parents could pick them up.383
Despite nearly three decades of precedent and federal laws indisputably prohibiting serostatus 
discrimination, the Pea Ridge School District demanded the students’ foster parents provide 
documentation the children were HIV-negative before they could begin school.384 Again 
advancing the tired position debunked in Queens nearly three decades earlier, the school district 
asserted it was requiring the students provide HIV test results because of “certain actions and 
behaviors that place students and staff at risk.”385 When confronted by the Arkansas Disability 
Rights Center, Neal reversed course and allowed the children to return to school.386 Whether the 
parents succumbed to the school’s demand of HIV testing is unclear, and the Disability Rights 
Center expressed concern that the state Department of Human Services may have improperly 
released the students’ testing records to the local school district.387
Officials at Milton Hershey School and in Pea Ridge are not misinformed outliers. An 
alarming number of people in the United States—including educators and healthcare workers—
remain ignorant about HIV basics. Around 1 in 3 people in the United States does not know HIV 
cannot be transmitted by sharing a drinking glass, touching a toilet seat, or swimming in a pool 
with an HIV-positive person.388 When asked whether there is a cure for AIDS, 1 in 4 wrongly 
responds in the affirmative. And almost 1 in 3 Americans believes there is a vaccine to prevent 
HIV infection.389
Along with misconceptions about HIV transmissibility, many people in the United States 
stigmatize HIV-positive men and women. A 2012 Washington Post and Kaiser Family 
Foundation poll shows nearly half of Americans would be uncomfortable having their food 
prepared by an HIV-positive person. A third would rather not have a roommate who is HIV-
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positive, and more than a quarter of the country’s parents would be uncomfortable if their child 
had an HIV-positive schoolteacher.390 Perhaps expectedly, respondents who harbored 
misconceptions about HIV transmissibility were more likely to stigmatize HIV-positive women 
and men.391 The poll results comport with other studies showing a correlation between lack of 
knowledge about HIV and increased prejudice against HIV-positive people.392
A national series of focus groups in 2009 provides context. Public Agenda, a non-profit 
civic research group, assembled people in cities across the United States to discuss their 
impressions of HIV/AIDS in America. Among the themes emerging from the focus groups was 
consistent “anxiety about the possibility of transmission through contact with HIV-positive 
individuals in certain occupations, such as medicine, dentistry, sports, food service, child care or 
teaching.”393 In virtually every focus group, participants “were clearly uncomfortable with the 
idea of having a teacher or doctor with HIV work with them or their children.”394 For the 
participants, “it was more about not taking any risks when it comes to the safety of their 
children.”395 One parent’s thoughts were identical to parents’ concerns in District 27: “[Y]our 
child is your number one priority. That should come first . . . If you know a person has AIDS, or 
you find out a person has AIDS . . . you might feel sorry for them, et cetera, but you wouldn’t
want them around your child.”396
Just as parents are sometimes wary of HIV-positive teachers, so too are some teachers 
fearful of their students. A public school physical education teacher discussed his internal conflict 
about whether he could give CPR to an HIV-positive student. “What am I supposed to do?” the 
teacher wondered aloud. “This [schoolchild] has done nothing wrong . . . she got HIV from her 
parents.”397
Lack of knowledge and information about HIV/AIDS and transmission was thematic 
across the focus groups. Many participants admitted they still relied on messages from early in the 
AIDS crisis, which made it difficult to distinguish between fact and rumor.398 A Des Moines, 
Iowa, woman recalled, “[W]hen AIDS first hit in the ‘80s, people started hearing about it, and 
there was all these rumors how you can get it and how you can’t . . . It kind of went away, and 
people started saying, ‘No, you can’t get it that way,’ and then like I said, no one really knows.”399
The early AIDS crisis instilled “so much fear in everybody’s mind that it’s hard to get 
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that out,” a participant in Birmingham explained.400 The same disjointed messages and politicized 
debates that confused and scared parents in New York City in 1985 continue as skepticism among 
many people today. One Los Angeles man expounded during a focus group session, 
[F]irst, it was just everybody thought you couldn’t touch anybody that had it. 
Then they come to find out well, no, you have to have blood. Then it come [sic]
to be intercourse, then they thought it was gays. Then they thought it was this 
and that. There’s a whole lot of rumors, and scientists are still studying and 
finding out every day.401
Nevertheless, participants nationwide acknowledged that misconceived fears about HIV 
communicability risked further stigmatizing HIV-positive women and men. Education about 
transmissibility would go a long way for eliminating fear and bias.402 The District 27 case was 
aimed at just that, and rescuing it from history’s dustbins will help shed light on how far 
Americans have come in combating HIV stigmatization over the past three decades—and how far 
we have to go. 
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